

July 24, 1979

Occupation: Government Agency employee

INTERVIEWER: When did you first hear about the incident?

NARRATOR: The first I recall was Friday morning. I don't know why it didn't sink in before that. I'm usually up, you know read the papers and what not but I missed. I'm sure I heard comments about it but it didn't register until Friday morning when really all hell broke loose around here.

INT: So you may have heard about it, but it just didn't make any impression on you until Friday?

NAR: The whole thing didn't register at all until Friday morning. I wasn't really conscious of what was going on until Friday morning.

INT: What happened Friday morning?

NAR: The telephone system went haywire.

INT: What do you mean?

NAR: Communication just stopped. Couldn't get in, couldn't get out. No phone calls.

INT: Out of what? Out of Carlisle, out of Mechanicsburg, out of?

NAR: Well, all the courthouse lines. Everything just simply went dead. And that was my first real warnings that there was a crisis as such happening up to that point.

INT: What was your connections with the telephones, were you trying to get in or out or were you receiving phone calls yourself?

NAR: Well, it was a combination of both. In a normal day to day operation, the phone system is used constantly. And ours went dead. I checked a couple other offices, they went dead. Then when they were dead there was no, everything just stopped.

INT: What do you mean by dead? Were they all plugged up with calls, or the phone system was no longer functioning?

NAR: It just wasn't functioning. You couldn't call anybody. Nobody could call you. It was just totally over loaded, and I couldn't get out, couldn't get in. So at that point I remember I was either going to the Commissioner's office, or were there, and talked about it, and Commissioner Myers and I went through the courthouse requesting each office only to use the phone system if it was absolutely necessary because of the overload.

INT: Did you know what the cause of the overload was at that point?

NAR: Yeah, at that point it was. We had become aware of the fact that Three Mile Island and there were problems down there and the overload was coming from that.

INT: How did you find out that it was Three Mile Island?

NAR: It seems to me it was the Commissioner. I was in the Commissioner's office and Tom Blosser, Commissioner Myers and a couple other people were discussing the situation. And that's the best of my recollection how I found out that's what it was.

INT: What did you think about it when you first heard that this was going on? Did you think it was a serious situation, a crisis, or did you think it wasn't particularly important or?

NAR: I felt it was serious at the time. Anytime you are dealing with nuclear power I consider it serious. Nuclear anything I consider serious, so I felt at the time we had a serious problem on our hands. Not even knowing what was going on down there I took it to be serious.

INT: Did you know that there was a nuclear reactor there at Three Mile Island?

NAR: Oh, yeah, yeah.

INT: Before?

NAR: Sure.

INT: How were you aware of it?

NAR: I was in the area when they were building it. When it came on line, rate increases and those types of things they were talking about I was aware, all those things taking place.

INT: Your occupation is what, the Energy Coordinator?

NAR: Right.

INT: What does that mean, exactly?

NAR: O.K., I've only been here since July of last year. All right. Basically what we deal in is energy conservation and alternative energy resources. We don't have any regulatory power. We are really more or less an educational type of program. We provide services also. We are getting into car pool matching and we go out and address groups, civic groups, high schools, just trying to spread the word, get the ethic instilled in people. That's really basically what we are all about. And as far as the county government's concerned this office is the linking pin for all energy programs in the county government itself. You take, the weatherization program is handled through the Office of Aging, but we are set up to coordinate that particular program with other areas. So.

INT: Were you working with energy before this job? Is that why you would have been aware of TMI before?

NAR: No, the reason I was aware of TMI was simply because I was born and raised here. And you can't build something that size. Friends, neighbors who worked there during the construction program. It was just something that you knew was being done but really had no great significance one way or the other.

INT: Did you know how far it was from here?

NAR: I had no, I mean I know where it is but in way of miles as the crow flies or drives, no, never.

INT: Do you know how far we are now?

NAR: Precisely.

INT: How far is it?

NAR: It's between twenty four and twenty five miles.

INT: Are we that far?

NAR: Yes.

INT: I heard we were between twenty one and twenty two?

NAR: Well, Okay. Maybe right. The twenty mile line runs roughly between Silver Springs and Middlesex Township, cuts an arc down across. Boiling Springs is like twenty and a half miles or something. So it was, you know six miles. But that was the way you drive and not the way the crow flies. So you may be right. It may be twenty one, twenty two miles.

INT: When you first found out about it, did you go around trying to seek further information about what happened?

NAR: Oh yeah.

INT: From where and what types of information.

NAR: Went directly, once we made a tour of the courthouse and notified all the staff, met Commissioner Myers in the Emergency Operation Center. And that's really where I went to for my source of information.

INT: You didn't go to the news sources or radio or anything like that?

NAR: Not at that time. When, in my capacity as energy coordinator I also serve as a staff in the operation center with public works. As far as public works and energy matters are concerned. This wasn't so much an energy consideration where I'd handle it. Okay, it was more of a emergency nature type of thing that actually falls under Tom Blosser's domain of responsibility.

INT: What position does Tom Blosser have? I know the name but I?

NAR: Okay, Tom is the director of the emergency preparedness staff here. Well, anyways what I did at that point was made the rounds and went immediately to the emergency operation center to find out what the situation was. How we were going to be affected, if we were. Really how bad things were in knowing. I didn't know other than the fact that it was a radiation release and whatever, had no real knowledge at that point what was involved. What kind of accident there was. All I knew was we had more or less a panic situation as far as the telephones were concerned.

INT: The county courthouse I have always noticed has big aerials on the top and I found out what, you have two way radios and I guess CB and everything else there. Is that, did that provide you or people around here with information about the situation?

NAR: We have, along with that, a teletype system through the communications center.

INT: Teletype tying into, into what?

NAR: Into the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency in Harrisburg. Okay, it goes into all sixty seven counties, the teletype network does. We have of course the fire, police, rescue radio service. The state police service is monitored. And as we progressed then we supplemented that with other communications back up.

INT: As you found out about what was going on, did your attitude change at all toward the situation?

NAR: I not quite sure how you mean.

INT: Did, at first you felt a certain way about it. Like you said that you felt it was serious because anytime you are dealing with something that's nuclear energy, it's serious. But your attitude change as you found out more about what was going on? Did you calm down some or did it make you more apprehensive or what? Did you get more?

NAR: No, my attitude at the time was simply, I think the best that I can recall, was what needs to be done, what area, you know, where do we go from here as far as planning is concerned. I didn't react really to, "Oh my God, there is radiation out there." Okay, that type of thing never.

INT: Did you talk about it a lot then with your co-workers?

NAR: Well, we at that point started establishing the operation center.

INT: Right away?

NAR: Making the changes and taking down the dividers and getting additional staff in and.

INT: Now when you say making changes and taking down dividers, what do you mean?

NAR: Okay, well in the way the operation center is divided it had, during normal operations tax claims shares a part of that, then the director's office, Tom Blosser's desk area and the director of communications, Ted Wise. His desk area is in that same area. There are dividers set up around those two desk areas so when we go to an operations mode, those dividers are removed. It's a matter of a couple nuts and bolts and they are moved out into the.

INT: To facilitate the?

NAR: It becomes one large room and we can operate everything from that point. That's really what we started to do at that point was to get that operation center in shape so we'd be ready to roll.

INT: How do you think people around you dealt with the situation? How were they acting and reacting to what was going on?

NAR: Other employees here?

INT: Other employees, anybody that you came into contact with at the time?

NAR: Well, a lot of curiosity as to what really was going on there. We got a lot of questions, what's happening. What could you say at that point? What little we knew there was a release of radiation and, you know, people were looking at it and there was nothing at this point to be concerned about. If it was we'd notify them. And those type things,

trying to maintain a rather calm level. And I think once there was someone who kind of reassured them that things, there was no reason to jump up and run home.

INT: Did people panic at the beginning or at least feel that it was so dangerous that they should jump up and run home?

NAR: No, I don't think we ever reached that level here. Okay, at least not in my opinion. I think there was a lot of concern as to is it necessary. Is this what we are supposed to do. But nobody, it would have been simple to say, look, I'm going home. I know in situations, where my wife works in Harrisburg one of the ladies said I have children in the school down there and I'm going to get my kids, and out the door she went. That would have been very simple to do here.

INT: Where does your wife work, by the way?

NAR: She works in the federal building in Harrisburg. The lady happened to be from Middletown and had children in school there and she was going to get those kids. So while they had that reaction at least there with the lady who lived in Middletown, I didn't see any of that here. I saw concern, nervousness type of thing, but no real panic.

INT: So how did everything progress then over the days in the, here in the energy office and in the county branch, as you were working, as you say it?

NAR: Okay, my office at that point was in the basement. It's a little cubbyhole in the corner, about 8 x 10 or 8 x 12 room.

INT: A little what hole?

NAR: Cubbyhole.

INT: Oh, cubbyhole, okay.

NAR: I left my office as such, went to the communications center, spent the day, the rest of the day there.

INT: This was Friday?

NAR: This was on Friday. The girl who was working as secretary stayed in the office to man the telephones for the first part of the day.

INT: Here in this office?

NAR: No, this was down in the basement of the courthouse. My whole mode of operations was at that point was in relation to the emergency operations center. In other words, everything that I was doing as far as energy coordinator was concerned, stopped. And I remained in that area, in the operations center itself until the situation was over. The girl who was working in the office stayed until the end of the day, the end of working hours and then she came over and volunteered to help wherever she could in the operations center. Somebody found her something to do. I don't know what it was. There was plenty to do at that point. Do you want me to just kind of follow through on the?

INT: Yeah, I'd like to know just how it went and?

NAR: By Friday evening, and that's really the next spot that registers in my mind. Okay, was about five o'clock or five thirty, after the rest of the employees were gone and things had kind of quieted down. You feel that, okay. John Broujos, the solicitor was there, Mr.

Myers, Blosser and myself and a number of other people. I don't really remember at this point. We were dealing with, well, I drafted the initial rough draft of what to take with you. It was kind of an announcement for the public if and when it was needed, what kind of procedures to take. Do you lock your house up? Are you expected to turn off the electricity? Or, how do you treat it? I made a couple of phone calls to the utilities, backed it up with their advice to simply treat it as though you were going on vacation or going away for the weekend. So I rough drafted that. That particular copy was probably redrafted and refined 8 to 10, 12 times before it was ever put in final copy. Saturday morning it was looked at by, I guess it was a psychologist. A public relations guy took a look at it and reworded it. We sat down as a group and went back over it and reworded it.

INT: Do you have a copy of that that we might be able to have?

NAR: Sure, someplace. I'd have to dig out my files on it, but.

INT: What's the name of that?

NAR: I think they called it evacuation instructions or some such thing. I don't recall exactly what the final title ended up being. It was something — take along a pillow. You know, your tooth brush. If you have any medicine. Those types of things.

INT: This would have been broadcast where? On local radio or published in the paper or what?

NAR: It would have been, probably both. Okay, we have the ability to broadcast; the emergency broadcast system directly from the basement of the courthouse. So that if we would have gone to, say an evacuation situation, the emergency broadcast system would have been cranked up. They would have broadcast all this information directly from the basement.

INT: And that would have gone out WHYL?

NAR: Right.

INT: Are you connected to any other local radio stations?

NAR: No, that's the local emergency broadcast station. Okay, now we maintained the whole way through this contacts with WIOO and the local television stations.

INT: You mean in Harrisburg?

NAR: Yes. Almost continual contact we had. There's a, oh I forget they call them — public information officer. Okay, during times of emergencies he comes in and handles that. So they were in touch. The rest, I don't know, the days just ran together from that point. I was averaging 18, 20 hours a day. I'd get out in time to go home, roll in one side of the bed and roll out the other and come back again. My wife had called my ex on Friday when they said about bringing the children in from outside to the inside and all that, to tell her to get the kids in if they were outside playing and what not. It happened to be my weekend for visitation, so my wife picked up the kids and brought them up to my mother's house.

INT: Where is that?

NAR: Boiling Springs.

INT: Boiling Springs, from Mechanicsburg?

NAR: From Mechanicsburg, right. They spent the duration at my mother's, in constant touch two, three, four times a day by telephone.

INT: With you?

NAR: Right. That way if there was. I could keep them filled in on all the little details so there wasn't, you know.

INT: How old are your kids?

NAR: How old? Oh, eight and four.

INT: Eight and four. So one of them at least was old enough to understand something of what was going on?

NAR: Oh, they both were aware of, that there was a situation, you know, that there was a critical situation going on. And the eight year old is a daughter, at first thought we were all going to die. That was her reaction, was we are all going to die. And they were, apparently had received a rather rude awakening in school brought in from the outside or whatever and told to stay indoors and those types of things. They were really more upset than I have ever seen them, quite concerned that some strange thing was going to happen to us, that we were all going to die. And they didn't understand where I was or what I was doing or why I had to be there and why I couldn't be with them. Which was a problem. My wife didn't understand that either (chuckles). When everybody else was, I mean her family had taken, packed up and went to Virginia to visit relatives.

INT: Are they also from Mechanicsburg?

NAR: They are from Lemoyne and Mechanicsburg area. They'd packed up and gone to Virginia, taken the dog and off they went. And it was (muffled).

INT: Did they put it as an evacuation or did they just decide to take that vacation, they might as well then or?

NAR: No, this was in direct response to what was happening at TMI. It was a nice time to go. It was convenient and all that, but they all packed up because of what was happening there.

INT: Did your wife stay in Mechanicsburg then?

NAR: No, she came to Boiling Springs and brought the kids to my mother's and spent the time there. My mother has a cabin up around Altoona and if the order would have come to leave, to evacuate, they were all going to Altoona in the cabin which was stocked with food and supplies. They could probably spend two, three weeks there if they'd have had to. Which to me, it relieved me of the worry of where my wife was going to be or my children and what would happen to them. Because I knew if they were with my mother, that if the order came to go there wouldn't be any problem.

INT: What did you think about being here at work? Did it bother you that you were here and not there with them?

NAR: Oh, it's obviously got to bother you. I think it would bother anybody in a time of crisis not to be with the ones you love. But you know I have a certain responsibility here that I was aware of when I took the job.

INT: Was it the kind of responsibility that was said to you that, or stated in some way or is it unstated that you have this type of responsibility?

NAR: Geesh, I don't know if it is written down anywhere on paper or not. It, I don't really know how it is formalized. My position as part of the EOC staff.

INT: What's EOC?

NAR: Emergency Operations Center. Shortly after I got here, Blosser, who I have worked closely with on a lot of things, talked to me about taking that spot, as far as the public works is concerned on the staff. And I agreed at that time. Okay, because it fit right in with what I was doing. But I don't know if there is any formal document anywhere that assigns me that task as, you know. Just simply that there was a situation at hand that needed attention and. It's kind of like going to war, you know. Nobody really wants to go but you end up going anyways because it needs to be done. And I think that's the way I looked at it, was geeze I'd like to be home, but somebody's got to do it and I probably would have been doing something anyways even if I wouldn't have had a specific position.

INT: Do you think you would have stayed at your work anyway?

NAR: I wouldn't have spent as much time. Ok, but I would've wanted to do something. It's kind of like the flood of '72. I didn't have any responsibility there but I was still out helping people, salvage furniture and move and those types of things, as a volunteer.

INT: As a volunteer not as a part of your job.

NAR: No. So, as a matter of fact I think I was in college then. I probably would have been doing something, but what, I may have been doing it from Altoona, but (chuckles).

INT: Did you think about evacuating at any time yourself?

NAR: Myself? Not myself, my family yes.

INT: They never did go to Altoona?

NAR: No, no. Never left Boiling Springs, thank God. No need.

INT: My wife didn't want to go anywhere at that point. She said she was staying where I was. She also felt the responsibility she had at that point with the children. I think she would have probably gone if push came to shove, but I never thought about it. I figured from the get go that I would be one of the last to go.

INT: You would have sent them on in front of you though?

NAR: Oh certainly.

INT: Did you feel at any time that we were very close to a real evacuation?

NAR: Yes.

INT: Can you explain that? How close we were and what was the situation?



NAR: During the whole question of the hydrogen bubble, whether it was real or imagined or whatever at that point it was very real and it was of major concern. Maybe the reason I felt we were on the verge was that's what all our planning was done for. Okay, we planned to evacuate. Once we had our plans, the only thing that was left was to maintain the operations to keep the information disseminated and see what happened. Okay, at that point during the time of the concern of the hydrogen bubble, I felt that we could have evacuated. At any time there could have been a notice come down to go. Okay. I think had things taken a turn for the worse, you know I think we were on the border line at that point. I think there were a lot of people who were saying let's see what happens. Okay, people in Harrisburg who were saying if it gets any worse we can start to move people on a small scale. If it gets better, it gets better. We don't have to worry about it. I think, I think evacuation was a prime concern on a lot of people's mind at that point. A real, a real possibility.

INT: You mentioned moving on small scale, what did you mean by that?

NAR: Well, the way they told the women and children to stay, you know, five miles to go off. I could see the point where they might have said ten miles. You know, depending on the nature. Okay, there was a. They took the women and the children out of the five mile when they felt it was necessary. If they would have felt it was necessary to take everybody out of a five mile radius they'd have done that. If they felt it was necessary to do it on a ten mile radius they would have done that. So I, when I talk about a small scale minimal type of operation, probably five, ten miles. It was minimal for us because we had very few people, none that fall within the five mile and very few that fall within the ten mile. So it wouldn't have been.

INT: As far as Cumberland County goes?

NAR: Yeah, as far as the county is concerned. So it wouldn't have been like trying to move ninety thousand people, ninety to a hundred thousand people out of the twenty mile limit. Okay, that's what we have between the ten and the twenty mile limit. You know, we've got ninety to a hundred thousand people. So if you are talking about moving part of New Cumberland, that's minimal compared to what we were really had plans to do, had made plans to do. Actually to relocate most of the county population wise.

INT: How was that going to be done, had that happened?

NAR: Early in the game or later on? Now, the plans were constantly revised and updated and I think they probably are still being revised and up dated. They would have been moved, at that point we would have had what we felt would have been adequate warning. They, once they moved, or had a general idea of what the problem was or where the problem areas were and what was happening with the plant itself, we felt that we would get six, eight, twelve hours notice. If there was going to be an evacuation made we would get some sort of advance notice on it.

INT: Twelve hours before the announcement would be made or twelve hours before everybody would have to be gone?

NAR: No, twelve hour before.

INT: Had the, why would there be such a lead time between the time you would get the notice for it and the time that it would be announced to the community?

NAR: I don't know all the technicalities of what would have happened with the reactor, okay. But for our purpose you need advance time to move your key people into position, okay. If you are talking about using two lanes of the turnpike going west that means that you are using two lanes of the turnpike and nobody else is. Okay, so that means blocking and rerouting traffic. It means being able to keep the people who would come across a bridge from Harrisburg either from coming across that bridge or to make a turn so they don't run smack dab into people going the other direction from this way. So we could not plan simply with just within the boundaries of Cumberland County, okay. We had to take a look of what's happening, we'd have been moving people into Franklin County, possibly down into York County although we never really had any plans. York County was doing all sorts of things. Dauphin County, the City of Harrisburg at one point told us they were going to bring people across the bridge where we had a road block set up. Okay, which would have just, you know. Had it happened on Friday, we'd have had real problems. I mean had we needed to evacuate. By Saturday night we were in good shape in the county, as far as our people were concerned we had the basics. It would have been a mess. It would probably be a mess today if we had to do it. Not as big of a mess. But we could have handled it by Saturday. No, no question. It would have been getting the key people into place. If you had the road-block. Road-block redirect traffic, to have your local Civil Defense people. Your fire, police, your sheriffs, deputies, all those people notified. They are all on standby anyway, so they'd have had to been notified of where they were to report and what they were to do when they got there and those type of things. So you need a little bit of lead time, okay. Besides that if the thing is going to blow up in twenty minutes it doesn't make much difference, does it?

INT: Do you think you had enough people to take care of that?

NAR: As far as evacuation ? Yeah, I think so. Oh there'd have been problems, certainly. You can't try and transfer something from paper no matter how well it's planned on paper into actuality without problems. But that's all, that's part of what crisis management is all about. It's dealing with those things as they come up. You plan for everything that you can ahead of time. But we have the operation center there with all the key people so that you can make decisions on the, you know, as they arise, on the spur of the moment type of thing. That's why an operation center of this nature is so critical in this type of operation. You really have to have a central command.

INT: Were you in good coordination then with the state police and local police?

NAR: Yeah, we had almost continual meetings going on between a number of people. The National Guard, the state police, the sheriffs' department, the local police chiefs on one hand. The colleges were in, educational institutions were in. We brought in the sewer and water people out at public works at another time. Sometimes we had two or three meetings going at the same time. Just constantly trying to update people and put the finishing touches on plans. Part of, I think what made our planning go so smoothly was we counted a lot on the local people to tell us what can you do. What kind of support are you going to need? All right. But we went to the local level and planned from there back instead of trying to plan from up here down. We made an assessment of what man power, what material and what equipment was available. And then how much more they were going to need. So we could come back and say Okay, you need another six trucks of some sort, and then we found them, okay. All right, whether we backed it up with

National Guard or wherever, okay. But we went to the local people first and said how much can you handle, how much assistance do you need, in what areas. That was really the key to what made the whole thing come together so well for us.

INT: Did you have anything, any particular areas of real problems? Things that?

NAR: Three Mile Island

INT: No. But in your coordination, in the work that you were doing here. Was there anything that was very difficult to handle?

NAR: I don't think there was anything that was really more outrageous than anything else. Getting accurate information about what was really happening in Harrisburg.

INT: That was the biggest?

NAR: Yeah, that was our biggest problem.

INT: Where were you getting your information from directly? You mentioned that you had this line directly to the teletype.

NAR: Yeah, we had teletype. We had a direct telephone line installed. We had additional radio equipment installed.

INT: A direct telephone line to where?

NAR: Mmmm. I believe it was the PEMA Bunker in Harrisburg.

INT: The what bunker?

NAR: PEMA, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency. I believe that was direct.

INT: That's interesting, you call it a bunker?

NAR: Yeah. That's basically what it is, is a bunker.

INT: I always think of Hitler's bunker.

NAR: It's, I've never been in it. I'm not even sure where it is, but I'm aware of what's there. It's simply that we don't call it a bunker because it's our basement and it's well enough protected over there that we don't need to fortify it as such.

INT: Although I remember I think something about plywood was being brought in.

NAR: Yeah, we had some ventilation ducts that were plywood over, should there been a major release of radiation. We can survive over there for two weeks without any. That's full staff for two weeks without anything from the outside. We have food, water, everything.

INT: In the fall out shelter.

NAR: In the operation center itself. All that we really needed to do was to block up the ventilation so we weren't pulling in the contaminated air, and we'd have been in good shape. That made it easier to function, too. Knowing that you're.

INT: Knowing that you would be secure?

NAR: Relative security. Probably as best security as anybody would have at that point. We were, that was probably one of the safest places in the area, so I wasn't going anywhere.

INT: As time went on, you were giving me a chronology of what was happening. I think we got up to Saturday.

NAR: Well, I'd say Saturday we felt that we were adequately set and plan wise that we could have handled it if they'd have told us to go and given us a couple hours notice. And Sunday just kind of was a, it was all constant, there were always things to do and more planning and more revising and more refining and little problems developing here and there. But Sunday was less of a crisis atmosphere, less of a deadline type of thing that we have to meet. I think we all felt fairly secure at that point that if they gave us the go that we could do it. Whereas Friday night we were still planning on how the hell we were gonna do it. Saturday night we felt that if they tell us we've got to go, we've got a way to do it. Sunday like I say was refining it. It was just normal, if there is any normal in an emergency operation center, it was just merely normal activities. In fact I think I got to go home Sunday night for awhile. Yeah, actually.

INT: When was the crisis peak recognized here? When do you think it was at its worst? And when did it start getting better?

NAR: Well they all ran together, days. I couldn't separate it from days. I'd separate it by incidents. The bubble, when the bubble went down was the... I think up to that point we expected it. I think it was getting worse up to that point. There were all sorts of things happening that nobody had figured were going to happen and nobody ever thought were going to happen. Nobody knew what to do with, and once the bubble miraculously disappeared is, I think at that point then it kind of was downhill from there on. I don't know when that was. It could have been Sunday, Monday, Wednesday. I don't know, whenever it was, that was it.

INT: Do you think what the whole incident at TMI, as it happened, has made the possibility of this happening again in a way, not so much made it possible to happen again, but made it possible for you to deal with better. Do you think that?

INT: Oh, absolutely. If this type of thing should happen. If, God forbid they would crank up unit one and it would go haywire, I don't think. We know what to do, and it makes it a lot easier having been, never been through it but at least been through that particular type of planning. Where you have all sorts of plans but none really happen to fit this type of situation so you have to tear them all apart and put together a whole new plan. Which was really what we were doing. So sure the works done, I mean that work that we were under pressure to do. That's done, so its merely a matter of calling people back in and doing it all over again, which the second time around it's old hat.

INT: Do you think that people would really be safe if it were to go out to say the ten or twenty mile area? Do you think that people could actually be evacuated effectively?

NAR: It depends on what you mean by effectively.

INT: Okay, well let me get back one more question then. You said you had a ten to twelve hour lead time. Did you feel at the time that that was sufficient? And did you think

that you would be able to get people out before anything blew up? Was the information in to you such that you would be able to do that?

NAR: Well, they told us that they could give us that much lead time after. In time days are bad for me, Okay, because I don't. The only day type of things that I can remember are Friday itself and Saturday night. Past that point it wasn't. It was judged by the whether the bubble was there or going up or coming down, but as far as anything happening on a particular day or a particular time, without going back to the notes that I made I couldn't tell you.

INT: But did they let you know that they would give you a twelve hour lead time, and then you would make you announcement, and then you would still have to bring people out? How long would it take, do you think, to evacuate everybody?

NAR: I don't really know. That wasn't part of my consideration. In all honestly, was the amount of time. That was somebody else's worry. I say that lightly, but in all seriousness I was never involved in the amount of time it would take to move somebody from one place to another. I never got involved in that part of the planning, so I couldn't tell you.

INT: But I just want to get this part straight, that they would give you ten to twelve hour lead time, meaning that between the time that they told you to evacuate and the time it blew up?

NAR: No, no, no, no, no. What they meant, and okay, we reached a point and I don't know where it was, but there was a point somewhere during this time that we were still saying, Jesus, how long do we have to do this. Okay, a very major question was how are we going to get any notice at all? Are they going to wait until the thing goes and then tell us to evacuate? It was something that we, I'm not sure anybody knew for awhile how much lead time we'd know. Then there got to be a point where I think they felt they had a handle on what was happening, and my judgment was there was a time when the people were — like Middletown, or at Three Mile Island or at Harrisburg didn't really know what was going on inside that building. Then there was a point where they began to get a handle on, maybe not exactly what had happened, but what was going on. They were talking about planned vents. They were announcing things ahead of time, were, you know. You had a feeling that somebody had a handle that, on things a little in advance. At that point we started talking about time, those types of things. Then there was a little bit later on, there was a point where they said we can give you advance notice. It's not just going to blow up. There's not going to be an explosion as such, if the situation. They were then monitoring it enough or aware enough of what was going on. Like the hydrogen bubble. If it got to a certain level or a certain size, or whatever where they predicted it would become explosive nature, that type of thing. They could calculate that out ahead. They could project it. Okay, they were playing with the computers by then. At that point I think they were saying we can give you six hours notice and that started to grow in time. We can give you ten, twelve. I think it had gotten to a point where they were telling us we could get twenty four hour notice, but I couldn't be sure of that. It just seemed towards the end that kind of, you know it would be at least twenty four hours from the time you were told until.

INT: Was there ever a standby notice that, you know, you may be told to evacuate or may be told to get ready for an evacuation?

NAR: I'm not quite sure I understand the nature of?

INT: Were they, did they ever tell you to stand by, that there may be an immanent evacuation order?

NAR: Not that I was aware of. We operated under that assumption, at least I did. Was that that could come at any time, all right. I don't know. Again I wasn't privy to a lot of the top, you know, top level information or decisions that were. You know that were, a number of people who were probably privy to information that I wasn't — commissioner Tom Blosser, head of the national guard, those types of people. But I was never aware of any stand by type of order. I just. I operated under that assumption from the very beginning.

INT: How did you think that the government handled the whole situation?

NAR: Which government?

INT: Well, whichever government?

NAR: I think the local governments did a fantastic job and I'm talking about municipalities and boroughs, in response to what we asked them to do, to their responsibilities as far as the health and safety and welfare of their people. I think they did an excellent job. There was an awful communications gap with the state. And what responsibility did the feds have? I think they had their responsibility before we ever got in that situation. So, you know, they didn't live up to their responsibility when they should have or we would have never gotten that far. So I think they left us down beforehand. I think the state was ill prepared to deal with it when it happened, as evidenced by the just total breakdown communications. And I think the lower you got, the better things got. And that's my assessment.

INT: What was the big gap between the state government and you? Or in the local governments?

NAR: Well late breaking news I got from the TV set.

INT: And not from the state?

NAR: Right. I've been having the same problem now as the governor's energy council and the things they deal with here. I hear things on the news before I get any information from them. And that's the kind of thing that was happening during Three Mile Island. It's like we did not learn anything from Three Mile Island. It scares me sometimes to think that all that could have slid by without some people waking up to the fact that we need much better communication. I think that was the real.

INT: How about once the federal government stepped in? The NRC and that business?

NAR: How do you mean?

INT: Did that, did anything improve once they stepped in?

NAR: Once, Denton, Harold Denton?

INT: Yes?

NAR: Yahhhh, as far as I am concerned he was the saving grace. He was a God send. He did not speak with forked tongue. I think he, in his manner, the way he handled

things and he appeared to be forthright and whether he was being honest or not, he projected honesty and calmness. And I think he reassured people that everybody else may be mixed up but Harold Denton knew what he was doing. So I think that helped a lot. But I'd passed that point, I'd, I don't know who was doing what over there and I wouldn't want to comment on that, but just from what was said in the media up until the time he got here and started to handle the press end of it was just total and utter confusion. You had your people saying conflicting things at the same time. And however they worked that out, whether they really locked Met Ed's people up in Hershey or not (chuckle).

INT: What was that that they said?

NAR: No, there was.

INT: Was that a joke or what?

NAR: Well, yeah, there was a rumor had flown for awhile that they had all of Met Ed's people under armed guard at the Hershey Motor Lodge.

INT: Armed guard meaning that they were protecting them from irate citizens or from?

NAR: No, protecting them from harming anybody else, I guess, instead of them being armed.

INT: Locking them up in other words?

NAR: Yes, yeah. The story was that they were told to sit down and shut up and stay that way until this thing was over. It's one of those things that comes down the pike and I never put any weight in it. It could have been true. I don't know. I thought it was rather funny at the time.

INT: Where did you hear it? Was it from someone in the county courthouse or was it from?

NAR: I don't even remember. It.

INT: I don't want to know who the individual person was. I'm just kind of curious about whether it came from an official person, was it told as if it were true?

NAR: Oh, no. It didn't come from any official source as such. In other words it didn't come down in a kind of channel of communications. It was one of the. I. Thinking back the best that I can recall, it probably came in the form of a question from one of the people, one of the public who called in and said, "Did they really have them under armed guard?" I had, somebody, I'm certain, asked me in the form of a question, was this really true.

INT: And that was the first time you had heard of it?

NAR: Yes, and the last. But it was kind of like the gallows humor that develops, and I just. It was funny, laughed and forgot about it really

INT: How did you think that the industry did handle the whole thing? Do you have any?

NAR: Met Ed?

INT: Yeah.

NAR: Disastrous.

INT: Why?

NAR: I am a firm believer when you have a problem the best thing you can do is tell the people you have a problem. If you make a mistake, the best thing you can do is tell the people you made a mistake. I really believe that as much honesty as can be given in these types of things. Obviously there are certain areas and certain times when you can't be totally honest with the "general public" (quote, unquote), whether it's national security reasons, as far as the military or the government is concerned or whatever. There are certain things, if you came out and said hey, the damn thing just blew up or is going to blow up in half an hour you'd create mass panic. No sense in, it would be totally irresponsible to do something like that. But to deny there is any problem. To deny that there is any thing major happening is just unbelievable. We all knew that there were things happening. We all knew there were problems, yet they were trying to tell us "Everything is okay folks. Life is normal and." You know, that to me is just unforgivable. I don't believe that anybody should be doing that. Government or private industry or anybody else.

INT: Well, was there anybody who you found particularly reliable, whose word you really trusted during this whole thing? Were there, was there one person or were there a number of people?

NAR: If we got it through our communication lines or if Harold Denton said it, essentially. I didn't believe another soul. I didn't believe another soul, not the governor, not the president, not anybody. I mean they. I don't know why. Because I don't know Denton, never met him, never saw him before, probably never see him again. Just that he seemed to be giving me the straight stuff. From what we knew, anyway was going on. He was dealing with it the best he could. Brought a sense of order to chaos and confusion as far as the news media was concerned, the screaming and the pushing and saying look. We are going to do this, we are going to do it orderly and just.

INT: Was there anybody that you particularly mistrusted?

NAR: Met Ed.

INT: Met Ed?

NAR: Yes, I don't believe anything Met Ed says. That doesn't come from Three Mile Island, by the way. That comes from prior to Three Mile Island.

INT: Oh really?

NAR: Yes.

INT: Well you are a Met Ed customer, I take it, obviously you live in Mechanicsburg and?

NAR: Was previously a Med Ed customer. I'm not any more, but my mother still is. That's where I was living in Boiling Springs. No, that comes from rate hike hearings and things and that dealings I've had with Met Ed before where the president, Walter Krites, just stood up and said that and just absolutely lied to the public. Evaded answers, blamed the customers for the problem rather than obvious problems with Met Ed that were contributing to the problems. Arrogant, self-righteous, we never do anything wrong, it's all your fault. I, so I had bad taste for Met Ed going into.



INT: This was in private life?

NAR: Yeah, this was before all this took place. I just.

INT: This had nothing to do with your energy office?

NAR: Oh no, I get along good with the consumer affairs reps from down there. We get along fine. Have no problem there. It had to do with. Well, I participated in their consumer affairs office here for the county, had a rate height hearing for the citizens of South Middleton, Monroe township and then I participated in that hearing, a kind of a joint effort at one point. Although I didn't really have all that much to do with it, she did most of the planning and I just went in support where I could. But it was prior to Three Mile Island ever taking off.

INT: Well, how did you think about the news media and their role?

NAR: I wasn't exposed to it that much. Okay. I, I did not see Walter Cronkite's broadcast until just recently. When he came on and said the world has never known a day quite like today. I suppose you could say that about every day, but.

INT: Did you feel that that was alarmist?

NAR: Well, after, but it was just a month ago or so that I saw that on a re-run. Okay, it was on a. It's your turn or something, CBS does it.

INT: Oh, it's letters to CBS or something?

NAR: Some such thing where they give people, the public a chance to respond. And it's the first I saw that particular broadcast. I didn't think it should have been handled that way. So I didn't, that seemed to be a little out of line. That falls in with what everybody else has been saying. I naturally at this point assumed that the rest of the coverage on national TV must have been, quite as, you know, that bad. Local coverage I thought was extremely good. Channel 21, WHP radio and television particularly seemed to be on top of the situation. As a matter of fact we, I got a lot of my information as to what was happening at the Island itself. We got plenty of what was happening in Harrisburg, who was planning on doing what and all that. We had no problem there. Where we had the problem was getting information as to what was going on on the Island itself with the reactor. We were monitoring Channel 21 and WHP radio, which did I think continue its broadcasting for quite some time on just updating the situation. I felt that was fairly good coverage, very realistic, giving you what you needed to know, or at least trying to. But like I said, I didn't get to see the national stuff. I didn't get to see much TV that week, or weekend or whenever it was. And I don't think I saw a paper until Sunday morning. I obviously hadn't seen Wednesday's or Thursday's because I moved, this all started on a Tuesday or Wednesday I believe and I had not seen the papers for Wednesday and Thursday, and I don't know why because I read them from cover to cover. For some reason I had not seen either Wednesday's or Thursday's paper. As a matter of fact when it was all over I went back and they still had the gum bands wrapped around them. And then I read them. You know it would be hard for me to judge national.

INT: Was there anyone in your life, around you that you were watching to, as sort of a guide for your own behavior? Was there anybody that you saw or you knew about or anything like that?

NAR: No, not really. I can't think of any. Tom, Tom Blosser, Commissioner Myers, obviously were the center decision makers as such as far as what was going on in the operation center. But as, if you mean to judge whether things were getting better or worse or what not, no. Or whether I should high tail it or stay or those types of things, no. Very chain of command type thing.

INT: What about, when we were talking about your connections and cooperation with the police and all that sort of thing. What about with the local fire departments and ambulance companies and things like that?

NAR: How do you mean, did we have meetings with those and Oh, yeah.

INT: How did they fit into all of this?

NAR: Ahhh, well there was a whole section of the plan dealt with manning those fire departments since they are volunteer fire departments. And what equipment was to be moved where, they set up task forces as to what equipment was to report where. If there was an area of contamination to keep contaminated equipment in contaminated area and uncontaminated equipment in other areas. All those considerations as, there wasn't really any area that we didn't touch base.

INT: What was their job though in this area? What were they going to be doing?

NAR: Well, the fire police would be backing up the other police as far as the police end of it. But the fire departments would have been helping direct traffic or responding to fires or whatever if you had explosions or normal types of situations. We had to maintain those essential services even if everybody else was going.

INT: Were they expected to stay, then?

NAR: Yeah, on a volunteer basis. Okay, we expected to have those areas manned. We have volunteer fire companies and they, they are volunteers. And they don't volunteer just for the good times, they volunteer for the bad times, too. I'm sure there would have been some who would have high tailed it, but most of those guys are the type of people who would be there no matter what. And most of their families understand that or they wouldn't be volunteer firemen.

INT: Did you have meetings and such with them?

NAR: Oh, yeah. With the local chiefs and all that, sure.

INT: Did you have any mental pictures of what was going on at TMI?

NAR: Any mental pictures?

INT: Yeah, any imaginings at the time? Did you think about what was going on?

NAR: Well, the first thing we did was figure out how the hell a nuclear reactor worked and where the problems were and precisely to the best.

INT: How did you find out how a nuclear reactor worked?

NAR: Well, I knew basically simply from being in this field, that it works on the same principles as a conventional. Yanked out some back up information on reactors for people who weren't all that up to date as to how they worked. We had a chart we drew up showing the different parts and how they related to each other and where the problem

developed and what was in the containment building and what was the cooling tower and those type of things. And actually I rather enjoyed that part because I was able to, it was one of those places where I fit in, being able to divide information. People who knew more on decision making things than I did. Some of the people who came in from outside who just simply weren't aware of what a reactor looked like or how it functioned. I knew basically how it worked. When they talked about a cooling system I knew what they were talking about so I wasn't, I didn't have much problem identifying with what was happening. There was one thing. I was not aware of the type of explosion they were talking about at first. When they talked about a nuclear explosion I was not aware it would not be a nuclear explosion as such. It was more of a steam type explosion than a nuclear explosion. I knew what meltdown was, all those types of things. When they started talking about explosions, I was trying to figure out how in the hell it was going to blow up. That's my first reaction, was somebody's nuts. You know, they're not going to, it doesn't work that way. Then when they started talking about steam releases and radiation releases, those types of things, that makes sense, obviously. At least to me. That was the one big surprise in all of it, that it wasn't going to. When they started talking about it blowing up, what kind of an explosion they were talking about.

INT: Did you have any sort of fantasies or day dreams or anything like this about what it would be like? If it did go? What it would look like? Did you have any mental pictures of it?

NAR: Yeah, I had this crazy picture of 90,000 people running in four hundred different directions saying, "Wait, wait if you'll all just go that way!"

INT: So you were yelling wait, wait?

NAR: Yeah, I could just see everybody going in sixty million different directions. I think if I had any fear or any fantasy that was it. Somehow all this planning was going to go haywire and there were going to be ninety thousand people and just bloody murder everywhere.

INT: Did you have any dreams about it, or sleeping dreams as opposed to day dreams?

NAR: No, strange enough I didn't.

INT: Were your sleep patterns at all upset?

NAR: Yeah, I dreamt about Vietnam.

INT: Oh really.

NAR: Yeah

INT: That's interesting.

NAR: Don't ask me why, but I did. It's one of those strange things, but I did. Probably the tension. Associated with the tight situation now.

INT: You were in Vietnam then?

NAR: Yeah, under pressure, you know that. Reacting more than acting, okay. You know, you set patterns and all those types of things. Touched base somewhere along the line. The only thing I dreamt about.

INT: Did you, as this crisis was going on, did you think about any other experience in your life that it was, you are thinking wow, this is just like?

NAR: Similar to or whatever? Yeah, you related it to the flood of '72 or, I had spent a week on a search mission in the mountains in Nevada for a young boy that was lost, and we had the command post and teams, and. You know, the whole nine yards. Basically, that operation isn't much different; it's relatively a military type of operation, what I call a military type of operation. You have a command post and people making key decisions and your inputs and your outputs and all that garbage. So it had just been awhile since I'd been around any of it. And I was more fatigued than I thought I'd be during the whole thing. I hadn't done anything like that for a number of years and it really, in the '72 flood I just pitched in and helped out and it was. I could go home and go to sleep. I wasn't under that pressure to perform 18, 20 hours a day for the duration. Okay, I didn't know what the duration was. And I noticed I was more fatigued than I remembered being before. Probably just because I am getting older. More out of shape, all those things.

INT: When you thought about things, during the day you said you thought about Agnes and things like this. Did you think about Vietnam at all? Because you did when you were asleep.

NAR: Not really.

INT: So that to you this was a completely different situation than Vietnam? It wasn't anything like Vietnam?

NAR: Similar in operations. Don't, I'm not quite sure how. But that had nothing to do with what I was dreaming about. The dreams were about combat type things. Whereas, the awake type of reflection was toward strategy operations planning, those ends. They were similar things.

INT: Well, do you feel that anything that happened has affected your health?

NAR: Probably die two years younger from cancer from smoking these things. No. Has it affected my health? You mean anything that happened?

INT: Yeah. During TMI.

NAR: Oh, I.

INT: Or from TMI.

NAR: God only knows. You know, lets see twenty years from now. I mean nobody knows how much radiation was released really, or where it went or all that stuff. If there are going to be any ill effects I'm sure we'll all find out about them when it is too late and you know.

INT: You don't feel that you've suffered anything yet?

NAR: What difference does it make? You know, I'm obviously no different than I was before it happened, so.

INT: Are you worried about it? Are you worried that maybe in twenty years, are you, do you actively think about it or is it just?

NAR: No, it's kind of funny. It's, it's done. I mean it's over. It's yesterday. There is nothing I can do about it today that's going to change me. If I am going to die of leukemia in twenty years, I am going to die of leukemia. And all my thinking about it and worrying about it now isn't going to make any difference. Okay, I mean if I was exposed to anything I was exposed and why worry about it?

INT: Did you go back, by the way, to your house in Mechanicsburg during this time at all or your apartment or whatever? Or were you living in Boiling Springs then?

NAR: When I went to sleep I went to Boiling — one night we went to Mechanicsburg.

INT: Did you feel nervous about going to Mechanicsburg? Going in closer?

NAR: No. It had nothing to do with going closer. It had to do with being further away and the time it would take for me to get back here if I had to come back. If I was called back. So that was the only real consideration.

INT: Well, getting back to the health again. Do you have any concern about food or milk or anything produced in the area?

NAR: No. None.

INT: So you are drinking the milk and so on. Did you think about your own death, for instance? Or anybody else's death?

NAR: No more than usual.

INT: No more than usual?

NAR: No, my concern I think was for my kids. For their health and safety now. Obviously what, you know, again, are they going to be affected twenty years from now. You know, that type of thing. I don't actively think about that now.

INT: You were saying a minute ago, if you die of leukemia in twenty years, you die of leukemia in twenty years and you can't stew about it. Do you feel that way with your kids or do you think about that more and differently than you think about it with yourself?

NAR: I think about it differently because it's them I mean, they go on when I go. They're the continuation, or whatever. But, yeah, they are kids. I mean they are little. They had no. I was here when the damn thing was built. I mean if anybody should have raised hell about it we should have raised hell about it then. So, you know, I mean if ... I lived through it when they built the damn thing and started it up and didn't say anything about it so if I go in twenty years of leukemia it's partly my fault, I guess. But they didn't know. They weren't here when the damn thing was built. And so yeah, you are short changing them. That's a concern, I guess.

INT: Did you always think that you would survive this? TMI? Say if worst had come to worst or anything had occurred?

NAR: Never, never entered my mind. It's, that's the reaction.

INT: Did you think about God at all during the incident?

NAR: No more than usual.

INT: Do you think that he figured at all in this? Was he somehow, or she?

NAR: I'd have to spend four hours on my beliefs on God. It depends on what you believe, I guess. And what you don't. If you believe in, know all and see all and knows what's going to happen twenty years from now, then obviously. I'm not sure I buy all that, but.

INT: What, did you pray, for instance at all during this?

NAR: No more than usual.

INT: In any way different from?

NAR: No, I. Only for the strength to go on I guess would be really. That's when I'm down.

INT: So not to get involved in the reactor?

NAR: God's, He's not going to. Maybe He made the bubble go away, or She, or Whatever. But no, I don't think. I don't believe in mystical and magical powers. If there's, if there is a God then it is probably more explainable than most people would want to believe and.

INT: Did you have any ideas about how it would be best to behave in a situation like this? Any sort of ethical or moral or religious ideas or anything like that about how to behave in a situation like this?

NAR: Yeah, you maintain as much calmness as you can and you do your job. My job at that point was to do what I had to do here. My wife's was to take care of the kids and to make sure that they got where they had to go safely. I depended on her to do that. When she got excited and panicked within herself I got upset simply because I guess it's the training that says, you know, you do what you have to do when you have to do it. Without regard to those other considerations. I would have seen that my kids were taken care of first. Somebody would have taken care of them.

INT: Did your wife continue to work in Harrisburg?

NAR: No, no. Well it was over the weekend sometime and didn't go back then for a couple of days until it was all over. Whenever it all ended. Wednesday or something. I don't know. We went back after that.

INT: Then she went back into the federal office?

NAR: Yeah, Federal building.

INT: So she stayed away for the first couple of days anyway because of that? Because of TMI?

NAR: Oh yeah. Yes. No question.

INT: Do you think that this incident was more or less frightening than, say a flood or a hurricane or something like that?

NAR: The potential. The potential.

INT: Was worse than a flood or a hurricane?

NAR: Oh, sure. A flood or a hurricane you have some. You can't really manage it, but you can deal with it. You know, the water rises and you can go up hill to get away from it

or whatever. You can build dykes and all those types of things. More along the line of a hurricane or a tornado where you simply have to do what you can and then pray like hell that you get through it all. With this it was the unknowns. That made it scary as such. You can't see it. You can't smell it. How do you deal with it? How do you explain to people how to deal with it. That I think was the big concern, the thing that made it really. And you talk about the potential of what, a hundred and fifty million years of non livability. I don't think there is anything worth that price. But don't quote me on that one, I mean, if I'm associated. That could get me in trouble here.

INT: Yeah, Yeah.

NAR: No, I don't. I think the risks far outweigh the potential benefits. In, I sat on the fence before Three Mile Island. But I can't anymore. And I just, I have to do it rather tactfully sometimes, because of the position. Because of the types of demands that are made, political demands. Okay, the political nature of those types of decisions. You have to be a little careful about what you say and who you say it to. But at this point I don't believe anything is worth that type of risk.

INT: A few minutes ago we were talking about imaginings and daydreams and dreams. Did any TV shows or movies come into your mind? Were they called up by this, like a TV show or like this movie? Books, stories?

NAR: Oh, I can't think of anything in particular. Probably the scene of ninety million, ninety thousand people stampeding probably was a reflection on a movie I'd seen somewhere but.

INT: You couldn't think of it?

NAR: No, there's no, nothing.

INT: Did you think of any movie at all during this time? Did you find yourself humming any songs or singing anything, just sort of over and over again?

NAR: No, not that I can. No, not really.

INT: Did scenes of the Atom bomb or Hiroshima or something come up in your mind?

NAR: No, I don't know how to explain it. It's a gallows humor sort of thing. It's the way I made it through Vietnam; it's the way I made it through this. It's, if you are going to get got, you are going to get got. So it's kind of a, no real, no real reflections on any particular movies or songs or anything. It's that crazy humor that.

INT: What sorts of humor? What do you mean by that?

NAR: I can't think of anything. Well, it's. What the hell are some of the things that were going around? The outgrowth was the T shirts. You know, the things that came out on that. "Hell No, I Won't Glow" and, you know. People would come in in the mornings and "Why, don't you look radiant this morning?" "Gee, you have a glow about you?" Those types of things. It's reaction, I am sure, to the tenseness. It relieves that.

INT: Why do you think it does that? Why do people, why gallows humor?

NAR: Maybe because it's bigger than you are.

INT: What do you mean? The humor is bigger than you are?

NAR: No, the situation. You're just small, mediocre little peons in this whole thing. Ants in a world of giants. You have limits to your capabilities. There are certain things that I would just simply up to luck or whatever. And if you are smart you'll accept that and realize that if it's going to blow, it's going to blow and if you are going to go you are going to go. What the hell are you going to do about it. The most asinine thing was to run off to Virginia. You know, that to me was just stupid.

INT: Why was that?

NAR: What good would it do?

INT: Maybe they would have gotten out of the area, had it gone?

NAR: Okay, they went to Virginia but it didn't solve the problem. So they really, they contributed nothing and they waited until everybody else did the job and then came back.

INT: But how could they contribute to the problems. Contribute to solving it?

NAR: To the solution?

INT: Yeah.

NAR: A dozen ways if we'd have had to go to an evacuation situation. We'd have needed lots of people at that point to direct traffic, and take care of any kind of injured or wounded or move bed ridden patients room for lots of volunteers at that point. And to me if you have a problem you pitch in and try and find a solution and don't turn tail and run. I mean that's just beyond me. I could understand the women and the children. Okay, I could understand that, but grown men, really. Just, it's an attitude that permeates American society today. It galls me, it really does. Because people won't get involved, it's turning the head and looking the other way and not doing anything about the problem.

INT: Do you think that really happened here during TMI, then?

NAR: Not the people that counted. I mean the people that counted really did, like the police, the firemen, those types of things, those types of people were here. Just, there were, if there wasn't anything you could do fine. Go on and get out of the way. That's fine. If there was an evacuation ordered I would have rather that fifty per cent of the people be gone already. That's less that you have to move. But there were a number of people who came in and volunteered their services. Doctors, people with some sort of knowledge about transportation or what not. It brings out the best and it brings out the worst in people. I got off track there somewhere.

INT: No, that's all right. Actually, I'm just about finished here. One last, a couple of last questions here? Do you remember getting any phony xerox memos, or drawings or anything like that, you know, where people are passing them back and forth? I guess I should record the fact that you have a piece of paper up on your wall in red, what is it, red marker?

NAR: Yeah, red magic marker.

INT: "I survived Three Mile Island, dot, dot, dot But things like that that might have been xeroxed and passed from office to office from person to person.

NAR: I've seen that.



INT: You've seen that, for sale private island.

NAR: Yeah, right, I've seen that.

INT: And the key travel, take a tour of Three Mile Island?

NAR: No, I haven't seen that one.