

Date: July 7, 1979

Occupation: Attorney

INTERVIEWER: Now I'll go to the questions about Three Mile Island. Can you remember when you first... well, if you can try to remember back. Some of these ask you to try to remember things as they were evolving then; others ask you to make reflections back then. Can you remember when you first heard about the whole Three Mile Island problem?

NARRATOR: Yes, it was right in this office when my secretary said with a certain amount of concern in her voice, "Did you hear that they had an accident at Three Mile Island?" She was quite, well, she was concerned. My first reaction was of no concern. I just felt that something had happened. I didn't think that, I had no idea that it would, or even had the capability of getting any worse than some type of accident. And I was a little surprised at her concern. And I just felt that she was reacting in a womanly fashion to a situation that caused her some alarm which I didn't think was justified.

INT: Okay, at that point then you didn't think of it as too much of a serious situation?

NAR: Not at all.

INT: Do you remember what day of the week that might have been?

NAR: That was a Wednesday; I believe it was mid-morning, late morning.

INT: Did your feelings about this change at all? I mean did you develop any more concern about it or--?

NAR: I developed some concern when I went to the courthouse later in the day, and we were talking about it and people there seemed to be a little concerned about it. And people would mention it, would look at each other, and then there would be kind of a silence, a pause, because they didn't know even how to address the question. They didn't know what type of risks would be there, like well, if a storm's coming, we batten the hatches or it might rain, or you might have a snowstorm. You have to get ready for a snowstorm and the effects of that are pretty clear. Maybe the courthouse would be closed and we'd get a day off. But here there was a kind of silence, a sensation that there was an unknown factor.

INT: Um, Hum, that people really didn't know how to get prepared?

NAR: We didn't know the risks; we didn't know the consequences and really didn't know what to do to prepare for it.

INT: Did you seek out more information at that point?

NAR: Not really right at that point. As solicitor I am responsible for the legal affairs of the county, and I do not have a responsibility for policy-decisions or day-to-day

operations. I sometimes move in a little slow on those things even though I have an opinion. And I didn't at that time do too much. There is kind of a gap in which I don't recall what else transpired in the courthouse.

INT: When would you say that things began to be of a serious concern either there or for you?

NAR: As I recall not too much happened during the next two days except discussions. I do recall on the 29th I was quite concerned because of the, what the newspapers indicated to be, a matter of importance. I was quite concerned that we commence planning as soon as possible. I recommended (and I'll tell you some things here that you're really going to have to get my release on before you use it. But I'll tell you now, and it can go on tape but this is inter-office). I was quite concerned that there be immediate efforts to know what the hell was going on, and I advocated on the 29th that we send down immediately a team to Three Mile Island to make reports directly to us because we were starting to get conflicting reports. I also recommended that we send some liaison over to Harrisburg. Well, about that time, either that date or the next date, the State had sent over from Emergency Preparedness a representative from the State to be in the County Emergency Preparedness Center. And the director indicated he thought that was sufficient. I said it wasn't enough. That was their representative over here. WE didn't have our representative over there. I also recommended that they send some type of a communication unit, like a, well in the military, in the Marine Corp, we referred to it as -- like a radio jeep -- a separate radio communication so that we could have direct communication by radio with somebody at the site to know how bad the threat was. No action was taken on that. I continued into the 30th to strongly advocate that we have plans, prepare plans, Frankly, there was an initial hesitancy to do anything. Now this, I think, reflected a general reaction throughout the state—our county was no worse or better in that regard -- that the state should give us some guidance and we should be told what to do, and we weren't being told what to do. And it was their responsibility, in a sense. It was kind of like a Federal thing. This is Three Mile Island. It was remote from my life, remote from our concerns other than listed under crises in other planning we had done. And it was all the way down on the bottom of the list.

INT: But you knew there was a reactor at Three Mile Island before this. But it didn't seem--?

NAR: I knew it was there. And I remember my reaction generally was that it was kind of an awesome thing, that it involved nuclear, that there was concern about discharges, that there had been studies out west indicating that there had been a discharge of radiation into an area in which a kind of a pocket had formed and there was an increasing number of cancer deaths that were in that area. And I periodically would be concerned with what was the situation out in the Susquehanna in the lower wind drift or in the lower water. And I was concerned for the environment and for people, but I never made it an active concern. However, I was never concerned about a specific accident. It just didn't occur to me.

Well, getting back to the county's reaction. There was a tendency throughout the operation from the very inception and right through the worst part of it to avoid panicking the public. That was such a tremendous concern that it caused hesitancy, and I kind of bucked that because I've always been a great believer in letting the public know what's going on, bring the public into your confidence and doing what has to be done and letting them know what you're doing.

However, time and again anybody that said anything in the county, and myself too, when any alternatives were considered there would be a tremendous concern as to what impact it would have on the public, panicking them. For instance, if there had been an evacuation plan talked about or "prepare for evacuation" or any statement that was made by the county or action taken by the county that would become public knowledge, it was carefully evaluated as to its impact. And that was a good concern. I think it was a factor that weighed too heavy in the early stages, and (again, confidentially, because I don't want this released) I was the one that pushed for planning, to have a plan immediately.

INT: Are you saying then that there was some hesitancy to do that in the early stages in part because they were afraid that it would have a bad effect on the public, that even the knowledge that such planning is going on would be problematic?

NAR: Well, there just wasn't a feeling that planning was necessarily required.

INT: Okay.

NAR: Now that goes back to another syndrome. (I oughten to use the word syndrome other than the *China Syndrome*.) And that is the reaction of the public to certain types of crises. I go back to June about the 22nd or the 25th of '72 during Agnes. I represented a township that had a sewer system, and I kept getting calls from them—well, maybe only about three calls—as to what to do in the plant about records and things. Well, everybody's reaction was that it was not going to get any higher. This was a syndrome that went all the way through even into Harrisburg. The Attorney's office was in the low lands. There were records that were left and inundated all over this area and everybody kept saying to themselves that's all the higher it's going to get. Look at the extraordinary height that it is now. It just can't get any higher. As a consequence, nobody took precautionary action.

INT: Okay. It's sort of an avoidance thing then. I mean an avoidance or a desire is projecting in such a way you want it to stop.

NAR: No, I don't think it's that. I think it's just that fact that, in a sense, it's a little like being optimistic about it or the incredulousness of it all. Here is something, the water has risen this high; it just doesn't seem like it can get any worse. And just waiting and putting off to the last minute to do anything and then when people were ready to move the water was there. Well, to some extent I think that happened here, that maybe it won't get any worse, or it is not going to get any worse; or it's something that can be controlled because we didn't really know the threat. Myself, I have been always so extremely security conscious because I've been in two conflicts, in the Korean War in combat and

in Vietnam in combat, and I'm extremely security conscious in everything that I do, overly perhaps, but I just react that way. I don't want there ever to be a situation in which I will have a loss of family or friends or loss of anything because of a failure to be prepared for a contingency. The cost of being prepared is very small. And I have run up against this all the time where people laugh at you because you do that. In Vietnam I used to have my rifle at the ready on a relatively mild stretch of road and the damn jeep driver would laugh at me. But I've been through it where security is so important. It's drummed into us in the Marine Corp from the very first day we walk into officer's training. "The road to hell is paved with bones of Second Lieutenants who failed to put out proper security." And that stuck with me all my life. Well, I was really concerned. Even the director didn't particularly want to plan, and his planning was limited to the alerting and the contact with his communication people. And there was a kind of a problem in planning in some counties is their day-to-day contact, communication, they have fire and police network and that kind of limits their vision, a kind of a tunnel or a blinder situation. They just weren't capable of looking out beyond immediately. Now they did have plans and outline plans and concepts that go beyond that scope, but they really didn't start paying attention to any of those things, most of those things, until I brought it to their attention.

INT: In talking about this you've cited a couple of past experiences, the Agnes Flood, experiencing in war. Did you think of those at the time, too? Were they in your mind as informing the way you wanted this to go then?

NAR: Well, let me say how they were in my mind. First, in terms of preparing, I've done a lot of planning. And I could see from my prior contacts with emergency operations, and in this one, that the military planning procedures were ideally suited to this. Now each type of activity – medical, grinding crystals, painting, carpentry work – has a technique, has a lexicon, has procedures, has a doctrine, (unclear), and military planning does. There are concepts of planning. First there is the receipt of some general guidance. There is--

INT: Which in this case you were having a little trouble getting?

NAR: That's right. And then there are the initial planning steps, then there are considering alternate courses of action and getting a general concept, stamping it out to be stamped, getting your recommendation from your staff and preparing your final plan and then disseminating it. There are many concepts of planning—there is a page here, we could review several if you don't mind going into it – but I was extremely conscious of the application of planning concepts to it. It's like a, well, the military moves people, and I'd moved large groups in Vietnam. And I know how extremely complicated it is. You've got to assemble in a certain area. You've got to communicate with them to let them know what's going on. You have to know what route you're going to take, what place to have check points. You need small-unit commanders to control the convoys; you need people in charge of the area where you're going to, your destination, your landing zone, your landing zone control. So all these came into play in evacuation going back to the planning. I pushed very hard for that planning and finally they decided to go ahead. And I just even had to get permission for me to start writing some things. And I

went down into the operations center, and I started writing. Then we realized that we couldn't do too much without knowing where we were going and, as page 3 here analyzes, the nature of our planning depended on the guidance we got. We got no guidance, really. We got different guidance. When the guidance changed we asked them, we got on the phone and I stood there with Jake Myers saying "how long will we have, how long will we have to plan; how long will we have to move?" and I even talked with a guy with the state – PEMA – myself and he gave very poor responses, very general, indecisive. So we could have gotten some guidance earlier, I think, that we would have used for planning. We didn't get it until Friday night the 30th.

INT: You did then get directive from them? You got a --?

NAR: All we got was this. First, we were told sometime in the morning to go ahead and start planning for evacuation. That's early in the morning.

INT: Friday morning?

NAR: Friday morning. We did start planning but we didn't get guidance until about 10:00 or 10:30 that night as to how far we would go. That is, we were told plan evacuation for movement of people from a 20 mile area westward within your county, care for them within your county. So up to that point if we thought we were going to evacuate out West somewhere we certainly would have to plan for a larger period of time, to go further, you know. You'd have to tank up; you'd have to take more stuff with you. And we were told the major routes we would use would be 81 and the turnpike west. And they were the 3 major points: the area of evacuation – host area, evacuation areas – the routes we would use, and it would be westward. Now with that we started to plan in earnest. And we developed that night, we worked pretty much through the night to develop a plan, to print it, and the next day we asked all municipalities in late Saturday afternoon to review the plan with them. However, in the morning on Saturday we scheduled a number of critical people like hospitals and others that would be of greater urgency.

INT: You've been in some ways directly, in some ways indirectly, addressing this question. I want to ask it directly now. Would you make an assessment of how you felt various levels of government responded. You've said something about the State. Is there anything more you'd want to say about it?

NAR: About the State?

INT: Yes.

NAR: My overall assessment of the State is that the State failed to adequately, not only assess the problem, the situation, but to come up with adequate guidance to local municipalities and particular to counties. The county is the largest political cell division underneath the State's concern. The county is a separate political entity. It has a strong communications system it is a large area easily controlled. The State coming down to counties would have only 3 counties to deal with rather than 300 municipalities, townships and boroughs, and as a result they had a built-in chain of command that was

very conducive to control. They control 3 or 4 counties better than several hundred municipalities. They wouldn't have to worry about the municipalities if the counties took on that responsibility of communication further down the road. Now they could not place themselves in the position of their lower subordinate units. They should have done that. They didn't do it because they had inadequate leadership to do it. PEMA, which is the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, has a head, Warren Henderson. He had the responsibility. I think he failed to meet that responsibility because he did not assess and communicate. He didn't make the decisions that had to be made. Now the State, I think could have said earlier there are 3 alternative plans that we may adopt. Start planning for these particular areas. They could have said now, and again using the military analogy, here is the situation – that's the intelligence aspect of it. There is in the military a five paragraph or, the first one is what is the general situation. You evaluate it. That's the intelligence. So the intelligence situation is, now here is the situation: here is how bad it is, or here is how bad, or we don't know how bad it is, but here's contingencies we could plan for, generally. Now the next paragraph would be the mission: plan for the following contingencies for evacuation. Next paragraph, specifically: plan for alternate A, alternate B, alternate C. Or at least we know that if we evacuate we're going to have to assemble. Start working on your assembly areas, in the lower part of the county or upper, whatever. At least do that much and then we'll tell you where to go after you plan. None of that stuff came down. Now they assume probably, no I don't know what they assumed, but if they assumed the counties knew that then they shouldn't have done that. They shouldn't have assumed anything. Because counties didn't plan for nuclear accidents. Nobody planned for nuclear accidents. The nuclear accident was pretty much the bomb situation, not the nuclear plant situation. Now they failed to use imagination and, as I say, to put themselves in the position of their lower subordinate units and say, what do they want? They failed to communicate. They failed to say, "Come over here and let's talk about it. Let's jawbone about it. Send a representative over here, a liaison man that's your man, that we can sit and talk about it." They did not ask us for even, that I can recall, for our plans. We told them we had a plan, do you want it? "Oh, year, fine, bring it over." Our plan was sent over to them, I believe, on a Saturday or a Sunday.

INT: So you got that plan together in about—

NAR: We got the plan done over night.

INT: Two days. Overnight?

NAR: Overnight, the general plan. Now let's look at the plan you asked about. The plan was a general mission objective that we had and duties of the different units, and general guidance on matters of control. And then we had, we started putting annexes to it, one annex for each function – the hospitals, fire, police, the routes, the use of the National Guard, agriculture, legal matters, so forth. As we developed the basic plan we obviously knew there were more things that had to be added so we sent our initial plan over which might have been 20 or so pages, and I just had that hand carried over – to get it to them. They didn't ask for it but we sent it. Then, later that week, on a Monday or a Tuesday night, I personally went over and took our plan. And at that time I thought I would run

into a beehive of activity in Colonel Henderson's office, PEMA. What I ran into was a very large, mammoth facility – room after room, space after space, wall after wall, chart after chart. The girl gave me a badge. I said, "I'd like to see Colonel Henderson." Well, I thought I would see one of his underlings and be referred to some staff person that would say, "Okay, yes, I see, well I'm afraid you can't see Colonel Henderson." She shot me right in to Colonel Henderson! And I went into his office and he had all of his typical paraphernalia of the military – their plaques and awards and pictures – and I said, "Colonel, here's our plan." He gave me the briefest of civilities (no coffee) and stared reading the plan right off, which I hadn't expected, which was nice of him. And he scanned right through the plan and he said, "Well, there's one thing missing in the plan. You don't have a system of adequately warning the people." And I said, "That's right, we're working on that." He was perceptive. He's certainly, probably, an intelligent man. He didn't call on his staff people then ... When I said we had sent our other plan over previously he said, "Well, I haven't seen it, I guess my staff has it and maybe they are handling it," or something like that. Here is the director of PEMA that had not even seen a county plan, which was the only plan that had come into him, on a Sunday during a critical phase of this situation. So, he really didn't know what was going on very well in his own office. So, there was no staffing, apparently, ever planned, evaluation of it, or – I mean there may have been some. A lot of things I didn't know went on. I want to qualify everything I say. I didn't know everything that was going on. Tom Blosser did an outstanding job overall, he really did. He had contact with him and some things came in that obviously I didn't know about because I was on the staff; he was the director. But my point is that they had not particularly asked for a plan that I recall. When they got the plan it was just another document to file. Well, then I went on down to Dauphin County, CP, and I talked with Minnick, their director, and he thanked me for a copy of the plan, because certainly there should be this liaison to coordinate between two counties that are adjacent to each other and they were going to move through us. They said as I left, "Oh, here's a copy of our plan," and they gave me three pages which simply said movement of people from area to another area via this road. And that was it, nothing else, just three pages of: from, to, road. York County in the meantime had sent something up to us. And that was a map with routes on it, period. So, overall, I think the County in terms of its plan had the best plan without any doubt. And it was as thorough as it could be under the circumstances. People knew what was going on as much as they could, and we had the concepts of planning which I haven't gone to. But getting back to PEMA, I think that they really failed to respond properly to this situation, particularly with a man with military experience Warren Henderson, which really surprised me.

INT: Do you think that had something to do with the Governor, and so forth, too?

NAR: I understood, well, it's interesting that at the time that the decision was made as to whether or not to close schools, our director, Tom Blosser, understood from his contact with the State that the Governor was in a conference with key staff personnel to make a decision on whether or not to close the schools. And he said Warren Henderson wasn't there. Now that's one indication that the Governor had, apparently, had little confidence in Henderson. He certainly, it seems to me being the head of PEMA, would have been in that conference. And from other reports which I can't confirm, the general impression was that the Governor did not have confidence in PEMA. The Governor set up, in a

sense, his own CP, and his own people, and was making decisions. The extent to which he communicated with PEMA, I don't know. But there was a general reaction and reputed condition that the Governor was bypassing PEMA on many of the decisions or he did not bring them into a lot of the decisions. Now, that necessarily doesn't say anything against PEMA. It's more a characteristic of a government, and particularly a new government, and it is similar – and it can work for good and bad. It's analogous probably to, perhaps, the Cuban Missile Crisis where decisions may have been made by President Kennedy with his ersatz, ad hoc command center that he set up with his brother and a few others, and they made good decisions. And here you got your command center over here in the Pentagon and maybe your National Security Council working somewhere else but it often happens that when a crisis occurs there is a tendency in government to get the people closest to you and maybe not talk to the Department of State. And you're aware of that situation, that dichotomy between the national security advisors like Kissinger under Nixon, Secretary Rodgers that certainly wasn't consulted too frequently, and the analogy with Brzezinski and Secretary Vance in certain areas. So I don't say that that system was necessarily wrong that the Governor adopted but the Governor failed, I think, in terms of planning, to understand the problems of the planners on the local level. He failed miserably, I think, in the one major presentation he made, I believe it was on a Monday or a Tuesday night. It was so brief that it left a lot of questions unanswered. It, I think, did not calm people necessarily. He was trying to appear calm and he wanted to be brief and in essence he said that, I guess, that the situation was under control; that there was going to be no evacuation – whatever he said. But it wasn't – he could have said a lot more. He could have jawboned with the people and appeared a little more relaxed and less rigid.

INT: What about the Federal Government? How do you feel they responded?

NAR: Well, of course, there is the aspects that I'm not that familiar with in terms of the Nuclear Regulatory Agency – Regulatory Commission – which had the responsibility for the operational aspects of it but within our own operations center we had sometimes one, usually two, and on occasion three, Federal representatives. They sat; they made no contribution. They were amazed at our operation. They said that they would take what we were doing and spread it to other counties because they had never seen any planning like it. They said that we were probably the most prepared county of all of them. They were not prepared really to give us much guidance at all. And I think that's simply a failing of any governmental agency to anticipate the unknown and to plan for the unknown. We, in a pure sense, could say they should have planned for it but you get to the point of being very understanding when you're not prepared yourself. Because the preparation responsibility goes right down to the local level. We, fortunately, and I will state this, because of my concern for planning, in this county were more prepared. For instance, in 1976 I brought in, as an intern from the War College, Colonel J. V. Knotts (Knox?), a Marine, who I asked to evaluate the organizational structure of our Operations Center, and he did, and that was kind of a framework from which we hung planning. I was concerned with planning for the next few years, too. We came into office in '76 and in '78 I obtained Colonel George Gatecy, one of the finest Army officers I have ever met, who I submitted a two page directive to, over the signature of the commissioners of course, to prepare a scenario for a hazardous substance damage or

crisis requiring partial evacuation of an area in Cumberland County. And he came up with a proposed scenario in detail for a toxic gas tankcar rupture in the Mechanicsburg area requiring evacuation of a portion of that area. It was an excellent study. That was another kind of a rack we could hang our hat on here for evacuation planning. But it gave us a sense of concern and a feeling for planning, which I think of the counties didn't have because they didn't have this ongoing concern. So we were, we had responded over the years to a situation that was more likely, that is it wasn't an unknown -- the hazardous tank rupture frequently occur. So we were in a pretty good position. Now, just to go on our state of readiness. We had probably the best director in the entire state. He had been to every single school on, Tom Blosser, emergency preparedness. He had an excellent relationship with his own staff. He's a good leader because he's quiet; he's calm, he listens to them; he respects them, they respect him. He's not autocratic. He has a feel for communications. He has had an on-going concern with civil defense -- emergency preparedness -- in the municipalities. Prior to TMI, in fact the prior April, a year ago, at a local government conference we sponsored he had one part of the program on emergency preparedness and he pressed and we listed all the municipalities that did not have a director of emergency preparedness -- a little bit to embarrass them, a little bit to goad them on. And we probably had every bill filled by the following March. And that conference again was part of my concern with local government coordination, and I had set that conference up, and we had brought civil defense into it because it was so concerned. I think it was Tom's suggestion that he come into that, and that's where the county works so well together. And he made a presentation and a package on emergency preparedness. So we had the personnel. We had, of course, the director. And then we had personnel that we were training in the local areas.

INT: So you had a hierarchy ready, in effect?

NAR: That's right. During the old days of civil defense in the '50s, late '50s and '60s, civil defense was just the remotest concern and it was a vestigial appendage out there in townships and nothing being done. I represented a township and often people didn't know who the civil defense guy was or he had some stuff that was stockpiled and nobody ever showed any interest in it. And the stockpiles throughout the state would kind of be dissipated and things would trickle away, and there was no overall concern or anything. And the state did respond with an on-going concern. And the State's enactment of the new emergency preparedness law which was just a year or so ago, '78 I believe, indicated certainly, I believe, a state awareness. But the detailed planning that has to be done requires so much preparation. You've got to have people well trained. You've got to be important. And this county had made it important. Again, giving credit to the Board of Commissioners, when the Democratic board too over in '76 they obviously were pressed, as any new administration is pressed, with placing their own people into key positions. They elected to keep Tom Blosser, a Republican, during the Democratic administration. There's another good aspect of this county government. They put first quality and capability of the individual. And Blosser stayed. They got a little flak about it, not much. And I guess he's still a Republican. And he had the continuity. And if they didn't have that continuity they probably wouldn't have been in a position to plan as well to meet TMI.

INT: You mentioned earlier a problem with conflicting reports. What did you mean here?

NAR: Well, let me tell you what happened to Dauphin County. Jack Minnick told me this that Tuesday evening I went over. The Dauphin County had received word – these times are just approximate – about nine o'clock from PEMA to prepare for evacuation for a 5 mile area. They went into plan for the five mile area. Then they got a call- maybe an hour later to prepare for evacuation for a 5 mile area. They went into the plan for the 5 mile area. Then they got a call—maybe an hour later to prepare for evacuation of a 10 mile area. And then they went back into the drawing boards and within a matter of a minute, I believe, they got a call, prepare for a 20 mile evacuation. Well, they just wondered what the devil is going on. What makes it change so quickly? So the word was changing and creating a certain amount of uncertainty. Now, what I meant was conflicting reports, was the state of the radiation release and the accident at TMI. There were reports that it was serious or not serious.

INT: You're talking about the media now?

NAR: Well, reports into media, yeah. Now, as far as the State, I can't say, I'm not really aware of the specific communications that came in. Now, another area in which the State failed is that it consciously, or unconsciously, used a dodge that isn't very nice in this type of situation. It sent few, if any, written directives. Over the telephone messages came. There were a few messages which are still on tape, and I may be completely wrong, but I asked Tom Blosser about this directly, a few messages about what to do, most of them concerned the radiation conditions at Three Mile Island. Very few, if any, direct themselves to planning. And I'd asked Tom shortly after the situation to be sure to preserve all of the ticker tapes that came over the Teletype and to keep a record or log of everything that came in verbally. And he told me himself that he doesn't recall anything really in writing about planning. So, not only were there some conflicting reports that may have come in by telephone but how the hell do we know really what we're to do unless it's clear in a written order. So they had a beautiful system. They had the Teletype. They could have just been rapping out, talking to us all the time, dialogue going.

INT: I heard you speak publicly about the media in, the role of the media, in all of this. Have you made a judgment about them? I mean, were they, did you find them responsible or...?

NAR: Well, I felt overall that the local media was very responsible. Let's take specifically each medium. The *Sentinel*: the *Sentinel* had their best reporter working on parts of it and that's Debbie Kline. She is very fact conscious. She can see important issues. She is accurate; she's probing. She reported excellently on different aspects of the planning. I'd say that her greatest talent in that coverage which on other occasions where I had been involved she had not exhibited the same talent, is that she listened to me when I explained to her some of the important points. I told her that the tendency of the media is to grab the sensational, to go with the "accident" aspects, the "radiation" aspects, maybe the fire and police aspects of emergency preparedness. Whereas the

planning aspects were extremely important. And I said the challenge to the press is to articulate complex ideas – is to articulate the relationship between the county government and the local government. And I said what we're doing here is very unique. We are after very deliberately arriving at this approach to planning. We are giving general guidance to other governing bodies – the townships and the boroughs. We are relying on them to implement that guidance with detailed planning on the local level. And that's again another military term. General guidance comes from the higher authority. General guidance is given because planning often involves details among people and institutions that are going to plan on a local level, not on a higher level. If you give general guidance rather than specific guidance you achieve a number of things on a local level. Number one, you've put the requirement of detailed planning where it belongs, where the people are going to be talking to each other, where they are going to know what the situation is—the capabilities of their means of communication, the capabilities of the people, where evacuation or rendezvous areas are. So, overall, the approach of the county was to not tell people how the hell to do their own job. Now, the military analogy is again, detailed planning at the local level. They did detailed planning – the townships and the boroughs. That does a number of things. It gives them the sense of responsibility. It involves them in planning. The planning solution becomes part of theirs. Now I said to Debbie, in relating all of this, I said – and this is one thing she left out of it; she just didn't have room for it. Incidentally, when she had reported this, it was a classic example of reporting. She just took verbatim what I told her and said all these things. And that's the first time anything like that's really been put in the paper. She didn't put this in either because of time or maybe it was a little melodramatic. I said, this is the democratic process. Now isn't nice that a press has an opportunity to expound on the democratic process in our society. Now what I said was democratic is that a democracy is the participation of all elements in your society. And the advantage of that is obvious – you get a better decision. You may not get the quickest decision; you may not get an autocratic decision. But overall it's going to be more fruitful because the people participate in it. It's like group discussion, the qualities and advantages of group discussion, the people participate, you get different views; the solution to the problem is theirs, too. So we achieved that to a beautiful degree. And I don't think, I can't judge these other counties, and I don't want to keep giving ourselves this great credit, and I'm not saying that they didn't do it, but if they didn't do it they missed a great opportunity. Because we had a feeling of working together that was the most rewarding I have ever had in government. We've gotten letters on it, Superintendent Shields over in Mechanicsburg School District referred to it; the editor, Wayne Powell, said “what you people are doing here is fantastic.” And he usually lends himself to superlative words when he's attacking the government. And President Banks, he said just glowing words. He said you people just did an outstanding job. So the point is that this occurred not because of one or two or three people, and it couldn't have. It occurred because of leadership -- leadership implementing sound ideas, democratic ideas, and sound planning concepts, and trusting the people. Now some people said, well these handouts on what to do in the event of an evacuation, we didn't get any. Why didn't the county send us --. We said we gave that responsibility to the local governments. Some municipalities distributed them, some didn't. Now it would have been nice if the county had printed them all up. We would have printed up 50 or 100 thousand of them. But in effect we

gave them the forms and said you duplicate this, see. So we broke down the function also of logistics in a sense of the duplication process. The cost is a factor. Maybe they had something local to add to that thing. They should crank out their own. Which some of them did. So there's advantages and disadvantages, but the advantages far outweighed the disadvantages. Now that's the *Sentinel* reporting. She didn't get into, as I say, to the democratic aspects of the situation. And I thought, I told her, that's a good human interest story sometime if you want to do it. And I think something that I've been wanting to pick up on, maybe somebody can pick up on. The *Patriot*, I can't comment on other than the fact they had the coverage of the event. I don't think they were sensationalists. The *Patriot* did not come into our CP. They sent somebody else over other than the local reporters. And I think that's a mistake. I don't know what happened to Nick Torro's relationship to the *Patriot* over there but Nick is an outstanding reporter. He's got a good head. He senses things. He has an excellent relationship with county and government officials. And he can get more out of somebody than some grubby, grabby guy from the home office coming over here and playing the big shot. The out-of-state media when they would call, usually obnoxious. They were the pushy, big-city type that's going to tell you, you know, act like you gotta give them the stuff. And we had different reporters like that come in, and we would respond to them sometimes, sometimes we wouldn't. We were a little uncertain. We didn't want to, again, to have the panic situation. Probably the most significant media incident was the unscrupulous, dishonest, unjournalistic manner in which the *Patriot* attempted to get, and did get, our plan for evacuation. Now I believe this took place Saturday night because it would have involved a Sunday publication. I will assume it was Saturday night. The *Patriot* called and said, "we would like your plan for evacuation." Well at that time we had been getting, as I had said, conflicting reports and we were put in the unique position, should we publish our evacuation plan which would list specific schools and other public buildings as assembly areas, routes of movement, and destinations? Should we tell New Cumberland you're going to move by, assemble at, school area X, move by route Y to destination Shippensburg? If we might change that word on them. So we really had a dilemma. The dilemma was that if we told them in the newspaper this is your route of evacuation, this is your destination, then the conditions that we were given or the evacuation orders were different and we changed it, what would they believe? Would the confusion that occurred as a result of two conflicting reports be greater than the assurances that the public had upon receiving plan A, would lead to – whether the assurances they would have from knowing that plan would be – would be better for their state of mind, you see. So there was a decision that had to be made there. We opted not to want to give them the plan and then they said, "but we have Dauphin County's plan and we have York County's plan." Bing, red flag. If, on a Sunday morning, the *Patriot* contained York County evacuation plan, Dauphin County evacuation plan, Cumberland County evacuation plan – no plan, then the public would have the sensation, "My God, Cumberland doesn't know what the hell it's doing; it's not prepared." The irony of it was, we were probably better prepared, see. And we were looking after interests more, you see. Well, something had to be said to the public. That's another matter, but I then, well, of course we took this to the Commissioners each time to make a decision and we weighed, again, the public reaction to no plan from Cumberland when two other counties had plans against, you know, the release of the information which may be changed and

create some confusion in the public mind. In fact some people may not hear the radio; they may even have clipped out the evacuation route and the Governor says "evacuate," panic, they don't turn the radio on and they go out. So you have people crisscrossing. Well, we just simply decided at that point that we would release the plan to let people know we had a plan. Because there may not have been an evacuation. You know there's a chance there wouldn't have. If there wasn't, at least they had a plan to have the assurances that we had peace of mind. Now, I wasn't going to let that go, and I proceeded to call the other two counties. And both counties said that they had not given their evacuation plans. I talked to Minnick, the chairman of the board of commissioners of Dauphin county and he said no. I talked to the Emergency Preparedness director in York and he said no. Now, they in fact had obtained it from some method, surreptitious or from some subordinate or whatever. And they were planned – the big, tough, city, you know, "Your opponent says this, what do you say to that?" And so we gave them the plan. And it came out all right after all; it looked nice the next day. And it had an effect on the public. The public had the information. But the manner in which it was achieved certainly wasn't complimentary at all. Now, getting back to the -- and frankly the *Patriot* did not concern itself with our in-house operations very well, very much. The *Sentinel* reporting was outstanding. For good level reporting it's the best. Now, getting back to this other question, the question of the, getting information to the public where there is a question of the evacuation plans. I, as you know, we had called in experts to help us. And that's another characteristic of our operation. We went out and we got people to help us. Immediately we went to Neil Wolf and the committee of Luetzelschwab and Priscilla Laws. And then I went to Steve Coslett, that's a psychologist, to review our documents that we were going to send out – tested impact. And we needed media help so I called Tony May. He is the gentlemen that had been involved in public relations and had just come back into Cumberland County from Ohio. And I said, Tony, I think we should have the Commissioners make a public statement. There is some confusion from the State, the Federal, where we have given our evacuation plan to the *Patriot*. It's going to be published. We want to put it in context. We want to let the people know that this plan could be changed. Now, people have generally a high degree of faith in government officials and if we get a commissioner on TV I think that he can in a calm manner state the position for the Cumberland County people. So I said, get the phone. I got data, well, I want to get the information first, and in the meantime we were trying to get the County Commissioner's approval. Then, I told him (because I'm careful this way) I said, "I want to talk to those people before you approve of them." I made that very clear to him. Well Tony is a pretty aggressive type. He knows his business and he likes to play his trade and in one sense he doesn't want somebody else kind of telling him how to do it, you see. Well I had the responsibility, I wanted the control; I wanted to make it clear to him. I heard him talking to them and I didn't think he, I didn't think he was rude, but I thought he was coming on a little strong. And he hung up. And I said, "Hey, Tony, I wanted to --. So then he told me what happened. He said, "they said no. WHP TV said no, because if they did it for us they'd have to do it for the other counties." Well, I was infuriated. We want to talk to our counties. It doesn't matter that other counties didn't want to do it. And Tony told them, if they're not prepared that's their business, or some other remark like that. If they're not ready to go on the air, if they're not prepared, that's their business. We are. Well, that kind of ended our effort at going to the press but he

did help going to TV. He did help us draft some statements that we tried to get out. We were always working on statements, over and over again, to get the right wordage. At that conference on Three Mile Island with the journalism outfits --.

INT: I was there.

NAR: Did I see you there?

INT: Yes.

NAR: Yeah, that's right.

INT: That's where I heard you speak about --.

NAR: Well, you remember the exchange we had?

INT: Yes.

NAR: Remember this guy said how rude this protocol was that said, "Well, he said, if those other counties aren't ready that's their business." And I was embarrassed because there was Minnick on one side and here's another county probably and that's where I jumped him. I said, you know, you're kind of rude to bring that kind of business up because that wasn't called for. I said no matter what that exchange was the point was we wanted to, and he was trying to make me look a little bad to defend his own position that he didn't...

INT: Yeah, I remember that. In fact I have a recording of that whole interchange. I recorded that meeting.

NAR: Yeah, I was really upset with that cheap shot. But he was just trying to get across the idea that there were other factors, so. I think that TV really failed in that regard. Now, it's interesting that my statement was reported in the *Patriot*, from that conference, in which I said, "Should this information only, that is the public official's statements, be taken by the press, edited, evaluated --.

INT: Yeah, you were raising an ethical question, as I recall.

NAR: And then pumped out of the people? Or should it come from the horse's mouth? Well, as you may recall, I put it in context. I said should there be a mix? Should there be not only the information that comes from the press and the media, which is correct. We'll give them release. They do a little bit -- we can't control what the hell they say. And they got stuff coming in from other sources. And they don't want us to put in a lot of irrelevant stuff like if the Commissioner says we were prepared for this thing from the very beginning; we got the best people here, and all that stuff. They could edit that out. That's their business. But I said, should there not be a mix?—the news media evaluating and sending out AND stuff coming directly from an official? Okay, well, Nick Torro, all he hears is "from the horse's mouth" and he was up in arms. "All the good press we've given you guys over the years and you treat us that way. You, 'from the horse's mouth'

you guys want to say everything.” He was really upset. And I had to go over and explain to him, this, and this, and this, and this was a mixed --. So the press lacks a lot of depth to them. They do their technical job but they don’t have the depth, except Debbie; she’s about that best. Okay.