

Date: August 21, 1979
Occupation: Military

INTERVIEWER: When did you first hear about the TMI incident?

NARRATOR: Initially, the first that I heard about it was somewhere around the 27th of March, I believe. That was when we started talking about it. I know before we alerted anybody we had to set up an antenna to try to set up our communication. Initially we received our, more or less get ready type of alert, on the 30th of March in the morning. At which time we were told to erect antennas and this type of thing for any emergencies that might come up as a result of TMI. At that time we were told that possibly our missions could involved evacuation of personnel, traffic control, sealing off the evacuated area, security, and providing local security and assistance through the evacuation chain.

INT: Where did you receive the alert from?

NAR: We are part of a task force which is called the 28th Infantry Division Artillery, and we received our initial notification from the task force of the 28th Division Artillery Commander.

INT: What did you begin to do then, when you first heard about it?

NAR: The things that we started to do, and this was before our units were alerted and everything. I had my full-time people do, we checked out all of our vehicles to make sure they were all topped off with gasoline and diesel. We erected a 2-niner 2 antenna to give us more communications ability. We started checking out our radiac meters and dosimeters to see whether we had those on hand or if they were being calibrated. Some of our desemitors were sent away for calibration so we did not have all our desemitors. We did have our radiac meters. We checked out all of our equipment that we might need for that type of an emergency if it did come up and basically we were just in a get ready status in case we did have to call out units.

INT: How did you feel at the time, when you first heard about it?

NAR: Well, during all our procedures I have been called out and I get quite concerned over the whole situation. I did not realize how dangerous it was until I read about it later. That's just recently that I've read about it. But at the time I felt that well, it's another emergency that the Guard is going to get involved in but I did not at that time realize how dangerous the mission was that we were going to be assigned.

INT: Did you try to find out more information on the situation? What actually was going on at the plant?

NAR: When we received our initial phone call I was not let in that much on the operations of TMI, how nuclear reactor type plants work so I didn't dig into too much of

the background on the emergency other than the fact that I was advised that there is a possibility of radioactive fallout and this type of thing. I really wasn't right into the nuclear aspect of it at that particular time.

INT: Did you try to find out more, by using the media, or reading any books?

NAR: At that particular time no, during the initial stages because at that time no one had anything. There wasn't that much publications out on it. I might add that we do subscribe to the National Geographic magazine and that particular evening when I went home I did dig into the National Geographic magazine which ironically had... the whole big spread on the reactor operation. At the same time I think they were showing movies on the Chinese Syndrome or whatever. It seemed ironic that that happened.

INT: Did you ever see the China Syndrome?

NAR: No, I didn't. I did not go see it. I did not want to see it.

INT: Why was that?

NAR: To me, it was a simulated type of thing that could maybe change my mind on things. I... there is fear in everybody's heart and I am one of the last to really get upset and if I would have seen the movie and realized the danger that might have been done at TMI, I might have been quite upset over it, particularly with my family and a lot of my relatives being so close to TMI. I found enough in the National Geographic.

INT: I went to see the China Syndrome a week before the incident happened and as soon as I heard about the problem at TMI my first thought was the China Syndrome. For about the first two days I was just completely head over heels just thinking about it.

NAR: Yeah, and I think most of the people that saw the movie were quite excited. As a matter of fact, some of them I think pushed the panic button immediately and I guess if we would have been aware of how dangerous it was, maybe a lot of us would have. You never know.

INT: So what happened after you went through your initial steps and you had your full-time people working on it and then what happened?

NAR: Well, initially the first day we got notified we just checked out all equipment. We notified units in Waynesboro and Hanover, Gettysburg, Columbia and Carlisle. We notified all our units of the possibility of an emergency at TMI and to make sure that the radios are mounted in the vehicles, make sure all vehicles are topped off, make sure all equipment is available and to more or less touch base with key personnel in case of call out. There were reasons for this. We notified key personnel because as a result of this TMI, it was proven during this emergency, some people, let's say that saw the Chinese Syndrome, automatically jumped into their cars and trucks and tried to move to safer land. Some of these people who moved to safer land were our Guardsmen and therefore

it took its toll as far as being able to come up with 100% strength within our battalion because some of these guys were already taking their families let's say to the mountain even though they were Guard members.

INT: Were some of these people key personnel or was it just?

NAR: Well in an emergency like that I would say that most of your people are key personnel because we have a battalion strength of like maybe around 300. And when we get called out for an emergency we need all 300 people because everyone is given an assignment. We try to work shifts but I know already that we've been out for the first 2-3 days like at Johnstown, there was nothing like sleep. If you got it it was like 5-10 minutes here because those first 3 days were like 24 hour days because of the emergency that happened up there so we were prepared in case it did happen down here.

INT: I don't know that much about the National Guard, they are something that comes out and helps people. Could you give me some kind of background like a run down or how it operates?

NAR: Well, you have two segments of the Guard. You have the Army National Guard and you have the Air National Guard. They both become quite active in national or local disasters. The Army National Guard depending on what type of unit it is will get an assignment for a role. Now in our particular case we are part of a task force which is responsible for an area. Let's say that area could encompass Perry County, Dauphin County, Cumberland County, Adams County and depending on the type of emergency it could have spread out as far as Chester. Our missions generally are what I had mentioned a while ago. We become involved in evacuations rescue, traffic control, security, and sealing off evacuated areas so looters can't come in and providing local security should evacuation be necessary. At that particular time one of the things we were concerned with if that place is radioactive and we have to secure that area our people are going to subject themselves to fallout and we were concerned about the type of uniforms and etc. to provide the security. The Air Guard, here again, they would have probably been one of the key items used for evacuation and probably one of the most expeditious type of evacuation because we have helicopters of different types that can carry a lot of people.

INT: So, you would be coming in landing and lifting people out and taking them to a safe place?

NAR: Yes, but here again and I think you might have seen that when some of these evacuations were taking place in Vietnam, people just panic and try to push onto the plane and get out of the area and there was people killed that were hanging on the runners of the helicopters. To try to control panic at such an installation is a king size job I think because everybody would have wanted on that first plane or chopper. Basically that's the roles we've been given. After the operation slows down I know many of our guys in all the floods, Agnes, Eloise, Johnstown, when we would finally get organized and would work 12 hour shifts when they would get off that shift they would even go out of the

houses and bring stuff out on the sidewalks for the local trashman to take away because everything was ruined. It's a king size role that the Guard plays.

INT: You can always fall back on them when things get going.

NAR: Well, we have had a few, now... we depend on the Air Guard ourselves the Army Guard does, because we... we have helicopters at our control here and I know at various times we have utilized the choppers to take the County Commissioners around to view the hardest hit areas and we can determine from there where the biggest emergencies are by flying over those areas. We do quite a bit of flying during emergencies, the Commander and myself, local government officials and I might add that what we have here in Carlisle, the Commissioners are very hard working people and they worked very closely with the Emergency Operations Director, Tom Blosser. It's a good crew. They are very close with the military and that makes it nice to be able to go in there and set up and operate and know everybody. Not only from the standpoint of the Commissioners but that whole work force in there, they will do anything. They are just a hard working bunch of people at that courthouse.

INT: Most of them seemed to have stayed throughout the incident.

NAR: Oh yeah. People would go home from work and come back in. They devoted themselves to that emergency.

INT: Stepping back a little, I'd like to get into how you worked with the county commissioner later on. You say you were notifying the people. How did you go about notifying 300 people?

NAR: We have what we call an alert plan. Now this alert plan, depending on the type of condition, if it is an all-out emergency, then we will use TV, radio, commercial telephone and personal contact. However, in this particular emergency, since it did not go beyond condition white which is notify key people to be on standby 24 hours a day.

INT: How many conditions do you have?

NAR: This I'm going to have to dig out. There are three color conditions for notification. We worked with the fire and rescue to come up with a code whereas they could alert their people also. Between the fire and rescue we came up with basic color coding.

INT: So were you two using the same color coding?

NAR: No, theirs was different. They felt that their code was better, I guess. Basically it boiled down to the same thing. Basically they operate like we do. I'd say the fire and rescue is almost like the military only their mission is different. They have to try to go in there and put out the fires if the place is burning down. That's some of the things we have talked about in at the court house if there is a fire in an area, let's say someone leaves

and leaves their stove on and that type of thing and the place is contaminate. They wouldn't have much choice but to let that place burn down or go in and contaminate themselves. These are some of the things we talked about which I think that from the standpoint of fire fighters, National Guardsmen we have to come up with a uniform which would protect us from radioactive fallout like if you seen on TV some of these people going around TMI in all these plastic suits. Conditions that we operate under and this first one is like a warning order as I explained to you a while ago – condition white. And under condition white, it is mobilization and deployment in emergency when it appears probably, and specific units, task forces and command groups are tentatively selected and notified of their status. That's what we were- one of the units selected as part of the task force and we were notified that our status was condition white. And then we have condition amber which is mobilization or state active duty by specific units or individuals and we have condition green which is movement of our units and or individuals from an assembly area like Carlisle to a designated assembly area or area of operation like down around the West Shore area and condition red is deployment of our forces into the objective area which would have evolved if they would have evacuated, deploying our people into the West Shore areas that might have been evacuated. Likewise furnishing patrol along the roads. We also had gas tankers lined up if people would run out of gas along the evacuation route, we would give them enough fuel to get where they were going or at least evacuate their vehicle off the road and get the transportation they need to the area where people were being evacuated to.

INT: So you were in condition white throughout the whole incident?

NAR: Yes.

INT: How did you go about notifying personnel that you were on condition white?

NAR: Initially I was told to call certain people to state active duty to act as liaison with the Cumberland County Emergency Operations Center and also keep our task force headquarters advised as to the status in our area so I notified by telephone certain staff officers that would work shift work at the courthouse – 12 hour shifts to man the emergency operations center. In addition to that I have full-time people here and I took all of the key full-time people and worked them into shifts so that each man pulled like a 12 hr shift and our mission then was to keep abreast of the situation and make tentative plans in conjunction with the Cumberland County Emergency Operations Center. We coordinated with, for example, we had... we attended meetings, the local law enforcement agencies to try to find out each specific area where the problems were and then we tried to program where we would send our people and our vehicles into their areas based on the guidance received from the local law enforcement agencies in the various areas. When you take all these little municipalities and townships and boroughs there are a lot of places to go and we have like maybe just over 100 vehicles running from like jeeps to quarter tons up to 2 ½ tons which carry approximately 18 people unless you want to jam them in.

INT: So how many full-timers do you have working for you?

NAR: I have with myself I have 16 full-time people. Not here in Carlisle that's throughout our battalion. We have 16 full-time people, what I classify as unit technicians. That also includes our mechanics which are here in Carlisle. I have 5 mechanics and a foreman who works out of the organizational maintenance shop here in Carlisle.

INT: Was everyone working on the shift?

NAR: Not everyone.

INT: Do you know about how many?

NAR: Yes, I can tell you here from my figures. Initially on the 31st of March we had 3 officers and the 1st of April we had 5 officers, on the 2nd of April- 2 officers and the 3rd of April- 1 officer and 3 technicians. The 4th of April we had 1 officer and 3 technicians.

INT: You notified them and they were working and then, did you notify the other members of the National Guard by phone?

NAR: You mean my other units?

INT: Yeah.

NAR: Well, yes I kept them right in on the situation on a four hour basis. They were not alerted other than the fact that we wanted them to be aware of the situation and they could possibly be alerted so naturally anybody who is going to get a call wants to know what is happening and we tried to keep them abreast of the situation at all times.

INT: Who was keeping you abreast of it?

NAR: That was from our Task Force Commander Colonel Armstrong which is located in Hershey. He is the Task Force Commander.

INT: It just sorta goes right on down the line then?

NAR: Yes.

INT: You said there are about 300 National Guardsmen...

NAR: In our battalion.

INT: And out of that you had some of them leaving, do you have a rough idea of about how many left?

NAR: No, because we never put the plan into effect.

INT: So it was mostly then staff people on the white alert. Were there 300 on white alert as well?

NAR: No, just key people. Just key people in all of our units. But we in the after-action reports that we got back and also from our own knowledge here in Carlisle we were aware that some of the people that were key people had indeed moved out of Cumberland County somewhere. Some had gone on vacation to the mountains with their families to a safe area. I know if we would have called and put our alert plan into effect that we would not have gotten – they would have been with their families.

INT: Do you still think you could have operated very effectively?

NAR: Yes, I do feel that we could have accomplished our mission with the personnel we had gotten out because we ran into this during other emergencies where people may have been flooded out and maybe had gone somewhere else and didn't get the word of the alert. Like I say our primary means of communication is telephone. We found during this emergency there were certain periods that the telephone lines were just completely tied up. If we would have just been able to go by telephone, we would have been hurting. We would have had to use radio and TV.

INT: So in that case you would have just called up the radio station and put your message out across that?

NAR: Yes, based on the guidance of our Task Force Committee our Commander would have given us to the methods to be utilized in case of an alert because one of the things we were concerned with in the case of an alert is causing public panic. In other words when you start putting things out on radio and TV and all of us watch it and they are going to say what is happening. The public is going to say what is happening and automatically there are going to be people jumping in their car and trying to go somewhere.

INT: They think they are going to evacuate soon and try to get a jump on it.

NAR: Right.

INT: So you would have tried to telephone and then sorta tried to go through a chain that way and if that didn't work you would have gone to the media if the situation would have gotten that bad.

NAR: Yes.

INT: Stepping back again, we have you on white alert and you have your people working on shifts, how did you interact with the local government? What was going on from that area? You had meetings with the County Commissioners?

NAR: Oh yeah. There was meetings after meetings. We had various meetings with the local mayors of the towns. That was a separate meeting. We had meetings with the law enforcement officials. They were separate meetings. There might be one in the morning and one in the afternoon and maybe one that night. In addition we had meetings with the fire companies and that would include the ambulance crews and that type of thing. Where we operated from in the court house we were right beside the representatives from Holy Spirit Hospital. They were non-segment nurse type Catholics who worked right beside us and they kept us abreast of what was happening from the hospital standpoint. The evacuation which I understand that they had accomplished some evacuation because they older people would slow down a mass evacuation, but most of our meetings were with these type of people. At most meetings the County Commissioners, at least one of them were there. We also had classes on the utilization of dissemeters in radioactive...

INT: Was that just National Guard or...

NAR: No, that was everyone. As a matter of fact they had the federal officials there who were right in on the radioactive dissemeters are not the same as the civilian type radiacs and dissemeters. The readings are different.

INT: How would they be different?

NAR: Well I might mention this to you it's in our after action book – military radiation detection equipment on hand in the guard is not calibrated to read low level radiation from the 0-1000milrims range, whereas the civilian type is I would say more sophisticated. Most people were carrying around the dissemeters of that type. It looks like a little pen you can stick in your pocket and it always gives you a reading in millirims and the radiac meters we found during our classes on the radiac meters, most of the fire companies have them, however, they are battery operated and we found that some of the radiac meters for example that we planned on using in the area of operation that was evacuated. In other words, they would have issued those two guardsmen and they would have been our assigned how far we were permitted to go into an area.

INT: According to the level of radiation?

NAR: Right. We found that some of those were inoperative because of corroded batteries and broken wires and that type of thing so from the standpoint of a lesson learned was that these should be utilized more often that they are. Because they were all in cardboard boxes and they were just taken out and there are a bundle of them in the country. But that was a lesson learned on that particular class that they gave for fire officials, police, guardsmen, and anyone who would become involved with the area of operation.

INT: Did you have some that were in working order though?

NAR: Oh yes, the ones that were not in working order were minimal, but if one thing would have had to be accomplished before we sent the guys down to that area, they

would have had... all, everyone would have had to be checked out. Like I said there was a mess of them. Everyone of them needed checked out just to make sure they were in operation to insure the safety of our people. When I say our people I mean the Cumberland County people who would have gone in that area— guardsmen, firemen, police.

INT: I want to try to summarize and make sure I know where I am. You were notified the 30th or the 31st?

NAR: We were notified on the 30th.

INT: All right, at that point you went on a white alert.

NAR: On the 30th we went into a white alert.

INT: And did you begin your meetings with the County Commissioner then? Or did you just work with your own people getting your own organization?

NAR: Initially after we got the telephone call here at my headquarters and I had the guy set up the two niner two and notified the units to make sure all units were topped off and all equipment was ready, I went into the court house and talked with Tom Blosser who needless to say at that time was a very busy man and he indicated the fact that they were going to have a meeting that evening and I said fine, I would come into that meeting which I did attend and there was quite a few questions asked from me from all areas. I'm talking fire and rescue, the police, etc. And so, that concluded the meeting. More or less things shipped out for that night and that was on the 30th. Then on the 31st I had another meeting scheduled in the morning which I said I would come to so I had gone to that meeting and come home and I got a call from the Agent General's Office that I was to go on State Active Duty and represent the Guard in this area and to contact certain staff officers who were also to work on State Active Duty which I did.

INT: What happened the 1st? That was Sunday.

NAR: On the 1st, I tried to contact some of my people, who I could not contact on the 31st. At that time our training officer was instructed that he was placed on state active duty, and he was to report to Carlisle. He works over in Hanover, and we called him into Carlisle to work on some of the plans that we were working on. Some of the contingency plans that we may have to use. Most of the day was involved in preparing contingency plans for evacuation for security, traffic control, and this type of thing. On the 2nd of April, our S3 began his active duty. There was briefings conducted by the commander and by Joe Daugherty about the update of the information as it currently stands. Again, we had shifts, working in 12 hour shifts. We were preparing to possibly bring people in from Philadelphia. Members from the 104 Cab if need be.

INT: So, would that be to fill in for members of your group, who may have been lacking?

NAR: Yeah. Like I said, this is another contingency plan.

INT: Just to be safe.

NAR: Right. We had again more meetings and briefings and updates. Most of the day consisted of that kind of information coming down from task force headquarters, up to task force headquarters. Basically that was the general operation the whole time we were in the courthouse. To be prepared. We had PEMA there, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency. We had federal officials from the government there, county officials. We all worked together as a ball team to come up with a workable plan for an evacuation. The state police worked very closely with the local police and all the other officials on how we were going to evacuate.

INT: Could you go through the stages of the evacuation on how there would have been an evacuation? What would they have done?

NAR: We have a plan dividing the municipalities and also assign them a group number. We would have taken East Pennsboro Township which consists of 12,440 population.; Hampton Twp. 11,847; Silver Spring Twp. 6,324

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NAR: Then group 17 which consisted of Mechanicsburg Borough which consisted of 9,385 and Monroe Twp. 3,326 people for a total population of 12,711, their evacuation route would have been PA 641 West, PA 174 West to PA 34 South to Mt. Holly Springs Borough. Then we would go into Camp Hill Borough, Wormleysburg Borough, Lemoyne Borough, and Shiremanstown for a total population of 19,521. Their evacuation route would have been US 11 & 15 South to Carlisle. And group 19 which is New Cumberland Borough, Lower Allen Twp. And Upper Allen for a total pop. Of 30,818. They would have taken the PA turnpike to the Carlisle Borough. Basically that covers Cumberland County. We have different evacuation routes for each one of these counties: York, Lancaster, Dauphin, Lebanon, Perry County. We had plans for each county, which way they would have gone. One of the lessons we had learned from this was that initially, there was not close coordination between counties there should have been established and what, let's say you and I both were planning to use the PA turnpike for evacuation and you are Dauphin County and I'm Perry County somewhere our evacuation might have conflicted. So what they have now is a good firm plan on routes to utilize in case of evacuation, which way are you going to go and which way I'm going to go. I think they do have that plan, but what I would have liked to see an evacuation employed just to see what would have happened.

INT: Seen the evacuation employed?

NAR: Yes, I certainly would have. Like I say, the only reason I say this is if we would have encountered any problems, it could have helped the whole US in planning for such an evacuation if one ever comes up in the future.

INT: What type of problems do you think you may have encountered?

NAR: We could have run into a multitude of problems. We could have run into people who do not want to leave their homes. You run into that in floods.

INT: Do people have to leave their homes? Or can they stay if they want to?

NAR: We could not forcibly make them leave their home. For example, we planned on utilizing loud speakers and bull horns and this type of thing and have people report to a designated area for evacuation where we would have commercial buses or aircraft or that type of thing for evacuation. If we come down that street with bullhorns knocking on door-to-door to evacuate to let's say the Shiremanstown school where all the people from Shiremanstown will be evacuated within let's say an hour, you are still going to have people who are reluctant to leave. We found it in floods. As a matter of fact when it got up to the second story we had to go and rescue them. That is one of the big problems. One of the little problems we talked about is that we were not going to permitting animals. Dogs, cats and this type of thing, but the more we talked about it... and goldfish... we got to kicking that around and we found that hey, that's part of the family so we did go the other way and say yes, they will be permitted to take dogs and cats and etc. But the owners would be responsible for the upkeep and traveling on the buses etc or however they would travel. But basically I think the big problem was that there would be people who would not evacuate because they are not aware of the seriousness of this particular radioactive fallout or radiation.

INT: How far out did your evacuation go? Was it a 20 mile radius?

NAR: We had a plan which provided for... we initially had problems on getting maps and PEMA came through and came up with some real good maps for us and we planned initially... had not gone beyond the 20 miles. For example there was a 5 mile radius and a 10 mile radius and a 20 mile radius. Now there was talk and we were still planning another contingency plan up to a 30 mile radius, but we did not go beyond that 20 mile radius as far as planning.

INT: Where is Carlisle on that?

NAR: We are right on the border of the 20 mile area.

INT: Was Carlisle going to be used as an evacuation center?

NAR: Yes, they had talked about possibly using some of the schools. As a matter of fact they were even talking about the new school right across from the MJ Mall.

INT: Did you go through a series of evacuation plans before you finally came up with this one? Or was this one you already had or arrived at?

NAR: No, most of this was developed as a result of this emergency and that's why I say there was a lot of meetings and a lot of planning and setting up different contingency plans and a lot of those had to be changed because of the County Coordination lacking initially. Now I think all the counties realize their role in such an emergency and I'm sure that York is going to coordinate with Carlisle and Dauphin is going to coordinate with Carlisle and they are all going to coordinate with one another with the operations aspect of it.

INT: During the emergency, did they start coordinating together? Like say, for example, Saturday.

NAR: I can't give you the exact date but through discussions with the State Police and that type of thing we found that some people were planning to use the same routes like say from Dauphin County to Cumberland County and so we had to sit down and revise in some cases our evacuation routes and the utilization of areas.

INT: So this did come up during the emergency? IT wasn't something that came up two weeks later?

NAR: Right.

INT: Let me just backtrack and try to make sure I got the evacuation straight. You should have been notified that there was going to be an evacuation, how much time would you have needed for you to set up and notify the people that there was going to be an evacuation?

NAR: I would say this is basically what we had talked about and in our contingency plans. Hopefully we would have 24hrs preparation time. That's what we were shooting for 24 hours. In this 24 hours, this would give us time to notify the commercial bus line, coordinate on the aircraft and that type of thing. There is another thing we run into was that we started checking around for qualified bus drivers. Some of the bus drivers were like some of the firemen and some of the guardsmen and some of the other people who had evacuated their family so we might have had a problem coming up with adequate numbers of bus drivers so here again the buses were there but there was a possibility that the bus driver may have already departed with his family to a safer area so in our contingency planning we started checking out bus drivers. And from that standpoint it was just a matter of 24 hour preparation to evacuate. That's what they were shooting for, they were hoping to have 24 hours. It was down to a possibility of 10 hours. Ten hours to try to alert everyone might have gone, but there is a big question mark on it.

INT: Who gave you the time for preparation? You wanted 24 hours. But who would have had the decision on that? Where would that have come from?

NAR: I think it would have come from PEMA. They were the big bosses of everything out of the Governor's Office.

INT: So during that preparation time you would start getting things set up and arranging for your aircraft, your buses, your bus drivers, and State Police would have I guess set out routes on highways and things like that. What would the National Guard be doing during this time?

NAR: Here we go back again, some of our people would have moved into that area. Likewise we would have assisted the State Police in movement on these different evacuation routes.

INT: Then you would have traffic control and getting people out of houses.

NAR: Right and likewise we would have assisted in keeping the routes open for evacuation like breakdowns and that type of thing and running out of gas.

INT: So that's when you are talking about having the gas set up?

NAR: We had planned on having a tanker truck down here at Exit 17 of 81. I'm not exactly sure unless I look at my plans here where the other tanker truck would have been. We would have also had extra cans of gasoline on our military vehicles in case someone would have run out of gas, we could have dumped a 5 gallon can to keep those people moving and to keep the routes open and in an evac. Like this they have to be open fast.

INT: Do you think panic would have been a big problem?

NAR: I don't know. I'd hate to see it happen.

INT: In any evacuation like that, is panic a problem?

NAR: I think in some cases it has been. I think if it was handled properly through the media that we are just going to move to play it safe, I think it would be alright. But at the same time if you present it that way there are going to be people say it hasn't happened yet so I'm not going. So it is a two-way street. Like I say, I would have like to see it happen. Not the fallout itself, but the plan put into effect and evacuated, just to see if it would have worked. God knows I wouldn't want to see the emergency create itself. I wouldn't want to see that, but I would like to see the plan because there was a lot of work and a lot of hours and a lot of brainpower went into the plan that we are developing and as I say it might have benefited the whole US and this is my own personal feeling. This is nothing in any of the actual reports or what have you but I would have liked to seen it happen. The evacuation part just for the experience factor.

INT: Do you think it would have gone alright? At the time did you think that things would have worked or just a totally "I don't know?"

NAR: No, I felt that it would have worked. But like anything that has not been tested, you will run into problems and those problems would have been the things I would have liked to discover so that if we would have to do it we would have a smooth fast working plan which would have given us some other ideas to incorporate into the contingency plans for evacuation if we would have made the evacuation and had the experience factor to see the problems we would run into. There is still that question mark, will it work?

INT: We will have to wait and see if another emergency comes up and maybe there will be an evacuation.

NAR: I hope there isn't any, but like Tom Blosser said we were just in yesterday and if you look back over the years in '72, there's been about 5: 72, 74 & 75, 76 & 79, I believe it is. That's all in less than 10 years. And that did not include some of the things that the military had called out on truckers strike so you never know. There is always the unexpected, such as TMI.

INT: So if the evacuation had occurred with that plan going door to door, we have it over sirens and we have it on the media and you move people out and now the National Guard is in the area and they have security to keep out looters and keep things tight. You mentioned problems you were worried about the type of uniform people would wear. What sort of thing did you have in mind?

NAR: Initially we brought up the question as to what is the uniform in a fallout area. We had no adequate uniform. I don't believe that the fire company does either. There are protective type garments to be worn. We do not have any. That was one of the comments that came up regarding the uniforms. This is a state after action report regarding personnel. A review of personnel problems of the Pennsylvania National Guard Personnel revealed that an evacuation could have resulted in significant conflicts between personal responsibility to members family and the individual responsibility to the Pennsylvania National Guard when liberalized to deal with the emergency. This was evidenced when many guard personnel residing in the immediate vicinity of TMI could not be contacted during the condition white operation. It was later learned that many personnel evacuated their families from the area before being notified of possible National Guard participation these problems were compounded when the radius of the area to be evacuated increased from 5-10 to eventually 20 miles. Additional complications could have resulted from the confused and frustrated mass evacuation.

INT: Just commenting on that last statement, you would have compensated for the loss of personnel by bringing in personnel from Philadelphia.

NAR: That was a possibility. In other words, let's say our task force covers a certain area. We do not have adequate personnel to cope with that emergency, then we would have gone to another command or task force for additional support.

INT: I just wanted to make sure of that because I have heard rumors from other places that you wouldn't be able to fill in?

NAR: A typical example is our units going to Johnstown. We reinforced another task force in that area because they did not have adequate people and a lot of the people in those Guard units in Johnstown were washed out. We would have had adequate people but we would have had to possibly go to another task force and ask for people that would come from our higher commands, the Agent General's Office, the Governor's Office, PEMA, they would make that determination of how many more people we would need. The problems on the uniforms came up and there was not a prescribed military uniform for that type of an emergency and one of the things that was recommended was sufficient protective clothing and equipment be obtained to provide adequate protection to designated members of decontamination teams of the Pennsylvania National Guard. What they come up with, this I'm still not sure of. But we still don't have that type of uniform or protective outer wear.

INT: Do you expect that they would have brought in something?

NAR: There is that possibility however at that particular time I don't believe there would have been time to bring in whatever we needed. There were no plans made for our guardsmen to wear anything other than possibly raincoats and this type of thing.

INT: Was there anything else about the evacuation that you would like to bring up?

NAR: I feel that there was a lot of lessons learned and has made us better prepared for an evacuation should it occur in the future which we had not planned for and I feel that given the proper amount of time for planning I believe an evacuation as we had planned out would work. However, we would still run into those unforeseen problems that would come up. Like I said people that do not want to leave because they can't see what is hurting them. People who do not want to leave because that is where they want to stay. They don't want to go anywhere else. There is always that reluctance to leave. I think that would be one of the big problems.

INT: Do you think it may have been more of a problem than in a natural disaster? Say a flood?

NAR: Probably so. We had them problems during floods when people could see the problem but when it its an invisible monster coming in to haunt you some people are going to be reluctant to leave because they don't feel that they are going to be hurt.

INT: A question that came up in other interviews and it hasn't been clarified and maybe you know the answer. A couple times people have mentioned lead-time, they need so much lead-time. Have you heard that term?

NAR: Yes.

INT: What do they mean by lead-time?

NAR: Lead-time to me is preparation time. In other words, like I just said a while ago our lead-time we were planning on was 24 hours. This would give us time to get all our people placed in the proper place to prepare to notify the people. The buses would be here, the guardsmen would be here, the firemen would be here and on a designated code, let's say red. They would be prepared in that lead-time to get themselves properly positioned for the attack, as we would call it. It would give them time to get there and then when they were given the code red then the firemen would start knocking door-to-door, the loud speakers would be up and down and the street with the bull horns, please evacuate to a designated assembly area and will be taken. That is to me what they classify as lead-time.

INT: That's what I had thought.

NAR: That's my interpretation of lead-time. That would give me lead time to give me lead time to get my people where they are supposed to be before the actual event occurred.

INT: I'd like to move now into more how your personal feelings rather than the National Guard acted. Is there anything you would like to add o the National Guard?

NAR: As far as the guard's concerned?

INT: Yeah. Like any issue.

NAR: The only thing I can add as far as the guard's concerned, I feel the people we had in the guard are experienced people because of the fact that they have been exposed to so many different type of emergencies. We have new people that continuously come in, but we still have the nucleus of an experienced forced that coped with all these emergencies that have come up. Like since '72. I feel that if we were called on in any emergency, we would be able to cope with that emergency and handle it properly because of the experience factor. Likewise we work closely with... particularly here in Cumberland County... Tom Blosser and I have a close rapport with one another. And we work closely together to coordinate and talk about things, not on a daily basis but I would say monthly or quarterly basis to try to better prepare ourselves for any emergencies that may come up.

INT: You mentioned how the emergency operations center was set up over at the courthouse, did you have your office moved over there?

NAR: Yes, now we also had our full-time people working here on an 8 hr. basis. They were not on state active duty, but they operated on an 8 hr basis and I had their home phone numbers and if they went anywhere, I knew where they were so I could get a hold of them. But my operation was at the courthouse. I was at the courthouse the entire time on my shift the same as my Commander. He was called to state active duty the second day and we called in our Chain Officer like the third day. We had people there that had been exposed to these types of emergencies before.

INT: How long were you over there?

NAR: We were at the courthouse, our particular unit, from the 31st of March – the 4th of April. Now the overall guard operation itself went from the 28th of March to the 5th of April.

INT: What would you say was the peak period when you felt things were most intense?

NAR: I have to look at my dates. That's hard to determine.

INT: Things sort of ran all together?

NAR: Well I would say that we got the word on the possibility I would say maybe, probably around the 1st of April somewhere, that was probably the most concerned because there were different times they would come in and say that there was a possibility that we were going to evacuate and there was times we didn't get involved in it, they started moving young people to other areas like Chambersburg. We were just a stepping stone away from mass evacuation. But I can't put my finger on any definite specific period where it was more critical than others, myself, personally, can't.

INT: Alright. It sort of rose and a general peaking then and tapered gradually down?

NAR: Yeah.

INT: Going back to your feelings, what seemed to be... when you first found out about it you were concerned about it but initially you didn't think it was critical, did your feelings change over the time? Did it reach a very critical point or would that have come if there had actually been an evacuation?

NAR: No, initially when I got the call I couldn't establish in my own mind how critical it was until I went over it in National Geographic magazine that particular evening that I got the call. Because we weren't called out at that time. We were just notified to be available in case we go into condition white and I went home and told my wife what had transpired and she said look at this and she showed me all these different pages on a nuclear plant and I started digging into it and I did become concerned. It was a very serious part of in nature and when I went to the meeting that evening I found out how concerned everyone was about it. Possibly I might not have gotten as excited as people who live in a 5 mile radius. I'm sure those people in that 5 mile radius were very excited but living where I do in Mt. Holly Springs from my own personal family standpoint, I did not become excited. But once I came to the meeting that evening at the courthouse... on Saturday morning... I believe it was Saturday morning, yeah, I was quite concerned. It was more of an emergency than I had anticipated.

INT: How did the general talk among your friends and family seem to go? Did they sort of start out feeling the same way you did and their concern became greater as time went on or do you think you were just sensitive to it because of your position?

NAR: No, any emergency comes up and I get very sensitive because of my position because I've seen these emergencies develop and I've seen them happen. I think that my family... my brother was more concerned than anybody. My mother came up and she wasn't overly excited about it. She's an older woman and she's been through some of these... as a matter of fact we were washed out in 1936 in Johnstown Flood in Harrisburg. We lived in Harrisburg, and we had to come back and cope with all of it. But she had been through it and my brother has not been through it. So he definitely wanted to sell his house right away and he didn't want to go back because of the possibilities and he's a college educated man. He was concerned with the different things that had been said about leukemia – it could be an outcome of radiation fallout and how it might not affect you now... and we don't even know if it will affect us. You don't know.

INT: Does that bother you at all? Do you think about it?

NAR: No, my number is up there the same as yours is.

INT: Do you think you may have been affected or you really don't know?

NAR: I don't know. I smoke and that has affected the body, too.

INT: Just an added complication as time goes by.

NAR: Yeah.

INT: Did you have any concerns about eating the food or drinking the milk from the area?

NAR: I thought about it. I generally drink about a glass of milk a day and it has entered my mind. I thought about it whether there could be anything in it, but there's cholesterol in it too.

INT: So, it hasn't stopped you. When did your family move in with you?

NAR: They came up I guess after they started pushing things over TV, radio, etc. They came up I guess Saturday afternoon. I'm not sure what that date was. I guess it was the 31st of March. And they also looked to me for guidance as far as what's happening. If I knew anything was happening I usually communicated with my wife on what was happening because they both had homes down there.

INT: Did your family ever move out from your home to move farther away?

NAR: We talked about it. We talked about the possibility when we were in at the courthouse talking about expanding the radius to a 30 mile radius, what we would do. I know what I would do. I would be here because my wife, during all emergencies, we have been flood up on the Pine Road in Mt. Holly, she's always stuck with the responsibilities because I'm here with the guard and we had a contingency plan laid at our home in case.

INT: And what as that plan?

NAR: We would have gone toward Chambersburg.

INT: Would this just be if they would have called an evacuation or if something would have come up they would have moved earlier?

NAR: It would have depended on the circumstances.

INT: Like if they would have called an evacuation of the 5 mile area, do you think you may have moved them out just for safety's sake?

NAR: No. Not even moved them on a 10 mile, but I would have started thinking when they said 20. That's when I probably would have employed my contingency plan to move further out.

INT: Do you have relatives out there that you could have stayed with?

NAR: No, friends. And there is a National Guard Army there, too.

INT: We haven't come across too many who evacuated. But it seems like everybody knows somebody who did. They may all know the same person- but you can't make any judgments from that. How did you feel about other people's reaction to the incident?

NAR: I think in some cases I felt that they overreacted. Probably because I'm not an excitable person. I'll use my brother as an example and his wife. She wanted to go back.

INT: Go back to her home?

NAR: Yes. He did not want to go so they stayed. He was quite concerned over the situation. They had left animals at home like rabbits. She wanted to go back and feed them. He said no way. Even though the neighbors did not leave. My wife volunteered to go along with his wife to go down and feed the rabbits and I told my wife she could go and only on the basis that I told my wife that she could go, did he let his wife go. So my wife didn't have that great a fear about the situation. I didn't have that much fear of the situation. Here today and gone tomorrow anyway.

INT: Do you have any idea of how many people evacuated in Carlisle?

NAR: I have no idea. As a matter of fact, it was talked about at the courthouse in the emergency operations center. That's where the bus drivers and that type of thing come up. There were different opinions on how many would have evacuated, but I have no idea.

INT: How did you feel about the media's handling of the incident?

NAR: Some cases I think it was handled very well.

INT: Were there any specific stations when you say some cases?

NAR: Not particularly. I just feel that some cases were handled well and other cases the media might have caused the people to panic a little bit.

INT: In what way?

NAR: They could have kept it a little more low-keyed. It would have aided greatly in the evacuation not to have everybody excited to the point of panic. Sometimes when those type of things happen on TV and everybody sits there and watches, ever time I'd walk in the house, they would have on TMI no matter what channel it was on TV- 21, 27, 8. Everyone was talking TMI. And they were in the Emergency Operations Centers quite a bit, particularly when some VIP would come in like Oren Henderson, the State Civil Defense Director. They covered all of those newsworthy items. I don't personally feel that the media caused that much of a problem. Everybody wants to know and just I feel could have been kept a little more low-keyed but we have to know. In the Army they say anything we put out has to go down to the lowest member of the unit so everyone knows what is happening, and what's going on. We try that- but sometimes there are things that we keeps low-key that go down to the lowest level.

INT: Did you listen to any particular source yourself over the media? Like radio or TV?

NAR: Yeah. I didn't get to see TV that much, but when I'd get home, yeah, I'd turn on and find out what was happening to see how that compared with what we heard in the EOC.

INT: How did it compare?

NAR: Pretty close. I don't think that people were fully aware of all the things that were transpiring at the EOC but we had our plans.

INT: How did you feel about Metropolitan Edison? What were your feelings toward them?

NAR: I pay Met Ed every month and I think I pay them a pretty good price for that electricity and I don't have that much appreciation for Met Ed. That's my own feelings.

INT: Do you think they could have done a better job handling what was going on?

NAR: I think they could have done a better job of training those people before it happened and like we have contingency plans and if an emergency like that did come up, they had no plans that I was aware of to handle such an emergency. I think they were deficient in their operation.

INT: Were you aware that it was an atomic plant beforehand?

NAR: Oh yes. As a matter of fact, I've gone down to that area fishing, right below there.

INT: How did you feel about the different levels of government? You said you really admired the operation at the county level. How did you feel about the state and national level?

NAR: I think Dick Thornburgh started off with a heck of a lot of responsibilities and I feel that top government from the Governor's Office down I feel that

[Continues on tape 3]

NAR: I feel from the Governor's Office down through the chain of command, even to our level on down to county level I feel that all of the people handled their responsibility in an outstanding manner when it comes to government.

INT: Do you feel there was any problem with communication between the Governor and the county level, like the state and the county level?

NAR: No, I really don't because we had a representative from the Governor's Office Joe Darhe who worked with PEMA with us the entire time. It went to the President of the U.S. where he sent people out to work in the courthouse with us and I feel from the top level down it was handled real good.

INT: Does that extend to the national level, too? Do you think they handled it well, too?

NAR: I do. As a matter of fact when President Carter and his wife made a trip to PA to visit TMI, it takes a gutsy man to do that and a gutsy woman.

INT: Did that make you feel better about the situation, the fact that he went there?

NAR: Not to me in particular. But I think the general public had an appreciation for that particular act. Based on them being there I think it might have calmed a lot of people down too to see the President of the U.S. and his wife going through the plant.

INT: That has come out in the interviews, people mention that they wouldn't have let the president go there. They were afraid that they would have to leave in the next couple of minutes or something like that. I just thought I'd throw that in.

NAR: Who knows.

INT: How did you feel about the NRC? Do you think they were working pretty well, too?

NAR: Yes. They did an outstanding job.

INT: Do you think Met Ed was in control of the situation?

NAR: No.

INT: Why do you say that?

NAR: I feel there was a lack of experience, a lack of trained people and I feel they do sneaky things that we are unaware of, particularly to those people who live in a close area around TMI. There are things that happen that we aren't told about and that's more or less to cover their butts. That's the way I feel about Met. Ed.

INT: Do you think Met Ed is in control of the situation right now?

NAR: No, I don't feel that they are yet. I feel they are now aware of the problem areas. It will probably take them another year to come up with the proper operation to cope with most of these emergencies. I feel personally the NRC will be breathing down their backs all the time and they know that they've got to keep their noses clean because if something happens, enough people know how to read a radiac meter and a dissemeter and I imagine there are a lot of people down around there that have probably gone and bought those things just to find out what is happening in their area. Although I did hear on the radio the other day that the Middletown area and that are of TMI, there is not a mass evacuation as far as selling houses and that type of thing. My brother didn't sell.

INT: How do you feel about Met Ed wanting to reopen the plant?

NAR: I'd say that the NRC determines that it's safe then I would say open it. The thing that I question when you hear it on the radio and TV is I don't know how they swung the deal to dispose of the nuclear waste, but if I was Governor of the State they wouldn't bring that waste into my state. My concern would be my people within my state and I wouldn't let them car it clear across the U.S. to dispose of it. I'd say if you made it, you keep it and find some place to get rid of it.

INT: Do you know where they are getting rid of it?

NAR: I heard on TV where they were taking it, but I don't remember. All I know is that it is going to another state. As a matter of fact I wouldn't even want the stuff coming through my state let along dispose of it in my state. I think that is a critical problem area that they gotta come up with something.

INT: That seems to be one of the biggest problems with nuclear plants – what to do with the waste. They have all sorts of ideas but have problems with every one.

NAR: That is probably one of the biggest problem areas of the whole operation – what to do with that stuff. I think that they got pretty good controls on the operation itself or at least they are working on it now. Before I don't think they were that overly concerned about it until the big emergency came up, but we do need it.

INT: What worried you most about the whole thing?

NAR: I think the thing that concerned me most was whether we would be able to handle the situation, the evacuated area. That concerned me.

INT: During the evacuation or after the evacuation?

NAR: After the evacuation. How to cope with that because I asked many questions about it. My concern is providing the welfare of my people and with that invisible monster in here, I was concerned over their safety. I was one of the first to bring up what we could do to protect our troops that we sent into those contaminated areas. That was my primary worry and concern. Taking care of those guys who would go down there and protect that property and whenever there is a flood or emergency of that nature – a disaster, there is always the filthy looters who come in the area and try to steal everything in sight.

INT: Was there any problem with looting?

NAR: There was some. As a matter of fact it was brought up in the Upper Allen area. It was either Upper or Lower Allen area, people were leaving and there were looters going in and tried to clean their houses because one Chief of Police had asked for guard assistance in those areas or state police assistance because there was looting. Not in great numbers but there certainly some guys who did it. The looters knew that the people had moved and they were going in to get their share.

INT: Did the guard move in then?

NAR: No, what they had done was coordinated with the state police to increase their patrols in that area. Most of those areas were secured after the Chief of Police was aware of the situation. Because there are a lot of people who will move and a lot of people who will stay in that type of emergency and they will ask their neighbors to keep an eye on their house and what the neighbors will do is call the Chief of Police and say hey I see a flashlight or lights on in so and so's house and till they get there they are gone and trying to catch him is another thing. They use boats in the creek sometimes to steal the stuff. Unless you pick him up with a spotlight on the river or the creek they are going to go across the creek and unload their loot.

INT: Did you have any calls coming in here?

NAR: Not that many. Most of ours were official calls. As a matter of fact even at the courthouse, I don't believe there was that many that came in other than business calls.

INT: I was thinking of the State Police interview. They had to keep someone on the telephone because they said they were just inundated with calls.

NAR: I can imagine the State Police got a lot of calls.

INT: You said you had contingency plans about leaving, did you think about what you would take with you?

NAR: You mean me personal?

INT: Yeah, you personal.

NAR: No, we had no plans of that other than the fact that we would take enough to survive for at least a five day period.

INT: So would that be like clothes and things like that or would you take food along with you?

NAR: No, we might have taken some but our primary concern was life.

INT: Would you have taken your pets with you?

NAR: Wouldn't have gone without them. We have 2 dogs and a bird and a cat. We probably would have left the goldfish. You don't get attached to fish like you do to dogs cats and birds.

INT: Did you have any mental pictures of what was happening at Three Mile Island? Or what might happen?

NAR: Well, yes I did. As a matter of fact it was explained to us on different occasions at the EOC what could be expected.

INT: And what was that?

NAR: Well they had a diagram of the... up on the bulletin board at the EOC and showed the TMI nuclear generating station and it went into the comparison of the fossil fuel and nuclear power and the nuclear fission chain reaction and the fuel assembly and that type of thing. The pressurized water adaptor We were indoctrinated on just exactly what would happen if it would meltdown. This thing would go down through the ground.

INT: What would happen? You said it would go down into the ground?

NAR: These right here are big concrete protectors. I know that they planned on bringing lead in. I don't know how many tons of lead that they were going to try to reinforce the bottom of this core to prevent a meltdown. But if it would have gone through and we would not have had sufficient support with the lead etc., then we would have had a problem on our hands and in talking with different people we were close to that problem. Very close.

INT: So what would have happened if there had been a meltdown?

NAR: Then you would have had a contaminated area. How far is a question mark: 5, 10, 20, 30? Who knows.

INT: Was there a possibility of explosion or did you think about that at all?

NAR: We talked about it. I was not aware that there could be an explosion.

INT: Did you worry about that?

NAR: I was more concerned about contamination particularly from the standpoint of certain people.

INT: Did you have any mental pictures of a meltdown? What that would look like?

NAR: Other than just looking at pictures in books?

INT: Yes.

NAR: Mentally I... in my own mind I weighed what would happen as far as panic, dust. I've already thought about losing everything I own. You could end up in an area that you could not come into and you have paid for everything. If you could not return to your area, it was my understanding that the insurance coverage on such an incident would be like \$.20 on every dollar. It would be like starting over again. You are younger and are still working for everything, but when you get older and you have everything you worked for all your life paid for and to start all over again it could put people in shock to realize that they could not return.

INT: Did you think of anything else that your life may have been affected other than moving out and all the problems?

NAR: No, not especially.

INT: Did you picture in your mind any effects of radiation on life around you? What the area would be like?

NAR: Yes. I tried to picture in my mind and what I pictured in my mind would be everything would be here like it is, but you could not use it.

INT: Did you think how it would affect animal life or vegetation?

NAR: Not really.

INT: Did you think of your own death?

NAR: No, I didn't.

INT: Or your family's death?

NAR: No, I didn't think about it. This is something I don't think too much about. It is going to happen to all of us.

INT: Did you think you would survive?

NAR: Yeah.

INT: Did you think about God at all during the incident?

NAR: Yeah, I always do.

INT: In what way?

NAR: I prayed to God that this thing would come to a screeching halt.

INT: Did you think of Him as being directly involved in this incident? For example, like He may have been trying to discipline mankind or showing him an error in his ways or something like that?

NAR: No.

INT: Did you have any Biblical images come to mind? Some people thought of the Last Judgment or things to come.

NAR: No, I didn't think of it that way at all. I had thought that with the development of nuclear power etc. both for war and peace and the Biblical quote somewhere that the earth will be destroyed by fire that there is always that possibility with the improvements and developments in nuclear are that this could happen, but not as a result of TMI.

INT: Did you think about that during TMI?

NAR: Yes.

INT: Did you attend a church service at all during the incident?

NAR: No.

INT: Does anything in your faith have anything to say about the rightness or wrongness of man's control of atomic power?

NAR: No.

INT: Do you have any feelings about whether religious persons or institutions should take a public stand on nuclear power either for or against it?

NAR: No, I say to each their own. There is always going to be some people for something and there are going to be some people against something. My personal feelings are that I am for it only because of the lack of power that we currently have and the way that we are being ripped off. Maybe someday we will have something that they won't have.

INT: When you were praying for God to intervene, did you pray for Him to stop the incident or to help the people who were stopping the incident?

NAR: I just prayed that it would come to a calm ending and everyone is safe.

INT: You had special responsibilities during the incident. Did you feel that they conflicted at all? Between your family and your job?

NAR: No, because I have responsibilities and when there is an emergency my wife has adjusted to the fact that I've been around here for 29 years doing the same type of work and she can handle things at home and I can handle things here.

INT: Were there any other special responsibilities that you had? You mentioned your job here at the guard and you had responsibilities towards your family, which your wife took care of while you were working here, was there anything else involved?

NAR: My two primary responsibilities are to my family and to the National Guard and like I say when there is an emergency of this nature I know my wife can take care of that responsibility at home and I know that I can take care of the responsibility here.

INT: Your ideas of how it would be best to behave during the situation was primarily to be calm and to do as you were told or how did you feel it was best to react?

NAR: Calm. As a matter of fact, I think some of the guys get irritated with me here because I will maintain calmness on the outside that I may not reflect on the inside. There are a lot of people that they have a feeling that it is going to come out right away. It is a feeling of panic. It was a feeling of being irritated with another person and it is going to come out now and try to keep my cool. And I feel that if I keep calm at least

I'm going to have that other person out there at least halfway calm. That's the way I deal with the operation and the people I associate with.

INT: Were you feeling calm throughout it? You maintained an outward calm but inside did you have problems?

NAR: At times I was excited on the inside and calm on the outside.

INT: Did this experience bring to mind any past experiences or past events? You mentioned earlier emergencies that you've been in, did you think specifically of any one?

NAR: Yeah, you always try to backtrack on your experiences and things that have happened and coming up again with contingency plans which is all that we did was come up with contingency plans. You try to call on the gray matter in the back of your head – what would I do in a particular situation like this if it happened and what did we do. It's just like quarterbacking a football team, the first year he gets creamed all over the place and the second year he gets a little bit more experienced. Like I said before we had experienced people to cope with these emergencies and this was a new one but a lot of it feel right into line with what we had done in the past.

INT: Did you think of anything in history that you may not have been involved in personally? Or didn't have to do with the Guard?

NAR: Not particularly no. I've been to a lot of schools and some of them dealt with Civil Defense and... as a matter of fact back in 1968 when we had the Pittsburgh riots we were called to Pittsburgh and everything started Civil Defense class and from '68 on, I think all people, the populous from all areas realized there was a National Guard and that we continuously be called be it a riot or a trucker's strike or a flood, a disaster of any nature and the only thing I look on is those past experiences and I was trained to do. When I go into something like this I have confidence because I feel I know what to do. If I know what to do the people who work with me, know what to do. If they don't know we will teach them.

INT: Do you feel that this was more frightening than a natural disaster because it is so different?

NAR: No, because I'll tell you why. All you had to do is go into Johnstown. Harrisburg was a slow rising flood. Johnstown was broken down. It just wiped out 80 people. When you go into that area, and see the torn up places, and what has happened, that tears you down. It breaks your heart to see all those people digging out cars with big hydraulic types cranes and hoping you don't find a body in that car. That is an experience that you only go through once in a lifetime. Houses just torn up. Just torn off their foundations. It was unbelievable.

INT: Did you do any daydreaming during the incident?

NAR: Probably did at one time or another. When things are slow the daydreaming may be something pertaining to the incident as to what can I do to maybe help the situation. So you try to grope in the back of your mind from past experience might help the situation. Grasping for new ideas.

INT: Did you think of any TV shows or movies? We mentioned China Syndrome before, did anything come to mind?

NAR: No. I didn't have time to think about that stuff.

INT: Some people thought of the old Japanese monster movies when there has been some type of atomic problem and things crawling up out of the water.

NAR: I didn't get into that.

INT: Did you find yourself singing any songs?

NAR: No.

INT: Did you have any sleeping dreams?

NAR: No.

INT: Did it disturb your sleep at all? Or change your sleep patterns?

NAR: No, if anything I probably slept better than I had because of the long hours. You have to adjust your body to different routines and schedules. Like a lot of times, there were two different times that I went in at 4 o'clock. (Tape ended) Most of the people that I dealt with at the Emergency Operations Center and the people that were in there were I think a well organized crew. They didn't panic. Probably where I might have gotten a little bit of feedback initially was when I told the guy he had to work 12 hrs. But even that wasn't a problem. After I explain to them what the situation was and what emergencies existed, they were very cooperative. I would say that the general feeling of the people I work with were cooperation, exerted energies and efforts and help from all angles. Just... the people are outstanding when it comes to an emergency like this. How much they'll dig in, and how much they'll work.

INT: Did this surprise you at all. Had you expected this?

NAR: No, I hadn't. There were so many things, like the County Assessor, Mr. Wolf, he would come over and I needed some things made – extra copies and he said here, give it to me, I'll type it up and I'll run it off. And he went and typed it up. He didn't have to do that, but he came in and did it. If I needed copies of different things run off or made there at the courthouse, there were girls there that said here I'll take care of it. I didn't expect that. It really made me feel good. It gave me a good feeling to know you have those kind of people.

INT: Do you think it has changed people in any lasting way? That now they are more likely to hold together during a crisis because they know things can be done?

NAR: I think from the experience factor yes, it probably has, but you take a good red-blooded American person today, I don't care who they are, even if they may be a dove, I would say if an emergency existed that they had to be called on they would do a good job. Any of them.

INT: Did you hear any jokes about radiation during TMI?

NAR: Not that I recall.

INT: Even if you don't remember any of them, do you remember any jokes going on around you?

NAR: Not to my knowledge. I hadn't heard any. The people that I worked with, they were very business-minded.

INT: Did you see anything like people Xeroxed a fake memo or something like that?

NAR: None. All business. Official business.

INT: Do you remember joking from other crises?

NAR: I honestly haven't. I think that the attitude of the people during emergencies is different than coming out here to work 5 days a week for 8 hours a day. I think when you are hit with an emergency or a disaster, people's minds automatically revert to another channel.

INT: So they think it is time to cut out the horseplay and buckle down.

NAR: Yeah.

INT: Would you like to add anything about your opinion of nuclear energy?

NAR: I think it is there and there are probably a lot of unforeseen things that can come out of it that can help the world today. It is just a matter of coming up with the right ideas and getting the brainpower together to figure out how to use it. I think that we got to use it.

INT: Do you think they will straighten out all the kinks?

NAR: I hope not. In my day but I would anticipate that someday there will be a TMI, probably greater than TMI. There's going to be a mistake. No matter what we do in life today at one time or another we make a mistake. If you aren't making mistakes, you

aren't doing anything. Hopefully it never happens but my own personal feelings deep inside is that it will happen somewhere. And only then will we know how devastating something like this is.

INT: Like now we are beginning to hear about other incidents that happened at other places that have been rushed over. Is there anything else that you would like to add?

NAR: I don't believe there is. I think we covered just about everything you can talk about.

INT: Is there anything you might have like any literature you might have that might be useful to our project that you could lend us?

NAR: Well all I kept was a copy of what I acquired at the courthouse and a lot of this, I'd say the majority of this you might already have copies of. What we talked about was... I'd love to lend you a copy of this after action report from the Pennsylvania National Guard which if you want to look through it.

INT: If we could look through it, it probably would help the professors because something I may have missed that they wanted to pick up on.

NAR: I would definitely want to have this back because the state only put so many of them out. As a matter of fact there were other agencies came and called on them and they did not have copies. This is the after action report of the Pennsylvania National Guard from our Pennsylvania National Guard Headquarters and there is a possibility that there might be something in here that could help you. I'd be glad to lend this to you.

INT: Could we make our own copy of it?

NAR: Yeah, you could make a copy of it. What I could do if it would save you a trip back is I'll give you a return envelope and mail it back. Anything that you could put out that would help in a situation in any shape or form I'm glad to see someone continue to follow through on this because after emergencies there is a tendency to more or less to talk about it the first month and the second month it gets a little less and the third month it gets a little less – you talk about it but there is no further action taken on it. When I heard your group was making this study, I said I'm glad to hear that someone was taking the bull by the horns and hopefully this will benefit the whole U.S. and maybe the world whatever you do.

INT: That's why we are trying to put together and publish reports for anyone who can use the data. I know like we have gone through over 400 interviews now at various levels like all the way down – so that includes like 1st graders up to senior citizens. We have been going into businesses, schools, like the senior action center, interviewing the county trying to get key personnel like you would be and trying to run together. We are starting to interview pregnant women.

NAR: One of the things, I don't know if you go into this area, but my daughter works with retarded people in town and she was quite concerned with the retarded aspect of it. How will I take care of my group? Like she is a supervisor for mentally retarded people and what would have happened if they would have to evacuate? What provisions would be made for this type of people? They are people probably older than you and I who need supervisors and so I had asked her to come in to the one meeting so she sat in with me on the meeting. At that time nothing came up on the handling of the retarded people and honestly I don't know of anything that we covered in evacuation that would have anything to do with dealing with the retarded people. I don't know if you have come across that in your studies.

INT: I have never heard anything brought up.

NAR: It might be something that you might get into. I don't know but my daughter was quite concerned because she loves all the people she supervises and it is a job that I would never want to have. Although I had the whole gang out to my house one day and there are some funny ones but nice.

INT: Yeah, I used to work with retarded people at my church.

NAR: I get a kick out of this one boy. He said "Hello" and I said "Hi." I'm Kenny and I'm Chuck and he came in and the baseball game on. The Phillies were playing and he said "Oh boy, the Phillies." He said "Melody is going to take me to see a baseball game, do you want to go along?" I said "If Melody takes you, I might go along." Each one is different. But she was quite concerned over that and how to handle something like that. How to keep them calm. Most of them are on tranquilizers anyway to keep them calmed down and that type of thing. She was quite concerned. We have also made contingency plans as far as supplies. For example for the highway shed we had plans on storing cots and different types of food stuffs at the highway shed and that was one of our storage areas. There and up at Shippensburg. That was another area we had planned on those being supply areas for this area.

INT: Where would you get all the supplies?

NAR: Most of them would come from the State Council of Civil Defense. Blankets, cots and also there is already pre-positioned equipment in different places. The Red Cross outfits have them throughout the state. There is pre-positioned equipment now.

INT: What about things like gasoline like you mentioned stationing tanks and things like that. Where would you get them?

NAR: Right now all of your gas that we get here comes from Smith Oil Co. So we did take the tanker truck down and fill that up or have them come in and fill up our underground storage tanks. We have 2000 gal. diesel and 1000 gal. low gas tank down here plus we have a tanker truck that hauls 600 gals of diesel and 600 gal of low gas. So it is enough to get us where we have to go.

INT: So you wouldn't have had to worry about private people?

NAR: Yeah, we'd have to depend on them to fill those takes up like Smith Oil Company. We also had big tanker trucks located at the Gap and with the aviation outfits that hauled like 5,000 – 20-25,000 gallon tanks on them. If need be we could call on them, too.